SCIENCE of GENEROSITY

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GENEROSITY: THE STATE OF CURRENT INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH

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Introduction

Notre Dame’s Center for the Study of Religion in Society (CSRS) envisions generosity as “the disposition and practice of freely giving of one’s financial resources, time, and talents, [including], for example, charitable financial giving, volunteering, and the dedication of one's gifts for the welfare of others or the common good.” While the term generosity is common as a general descriptor in the literature on social behavior, it has yet to be conceptualized, let alone systematically addressed in research. Like the CSRS and Merriam Webster, we see generosity as unique in that it is the habit of giving, or the quality of being “generous” (i.e. willing to share and give, not selfish, characterized by a noble, forgiving, and kind spirit, magnanimous). In other words, it is something that, while perhaps not manifested in a single long-term behavior, is often believed as something good to express consistently throughout life. As such, generosity is distinct from mere prosocial behavior—a line of inquiry heavily pursued by psychologists—and deserves its own theoretical conceptualization and further consideration in future research.

To set the stage for more rigorous attention to generosity, in the following paper we review the current state of research on prosocial behavior, including its greatest obstacle—lack of conceptualization. We highlight various causes, forms, and consequences of prosocial actions and attempt to distinguish between those types that are often confounded in the literature. We also specifically address the limits of the individual, psychological basis of much of the prosocial literature and outline the benefits of a more nuanced sociological approach. Not meant to be an exhaustive literature review, this paper focuses on social psychological research and explanations as we attempt to clarify the field related to generosity and make suggestions for future research and theoretical development. ¹

The Problem of Conceptualization

The largest hurdle in an effort to conceptualize generosity is the lack of conceptualization and theorization of even the most standard concepts in the prosocial literature. We find that there is little agreement about what exactly is meant by a number of terms, including, most troubling, the scope of prosocial behavior itself, as well as its most basic components: altruism and helping. The research on altruism—voluntary and intentional help to another, offering no external reward, and perhaps even a

¹ Five review pieces relevant to prosocial research that may be of interest are Bekkers and Wiepking (in progress), Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, and Penner (2006), Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, and Schroeder (2004), Piliavin and Charng (1990), and Wilson (2000).
cost, to the helper (Macaulay & Berkowitz 1970; Simmons 1991)—tends to confound various dimensions of the altruistic act. Whether the act is one-shot or continuous, for a friend or a stranger, and costly or not, is often ignored. As a result, it is often assumed that any type of altruistic act has the same causes and consequences, regardless of form. Helping—when the well-being of one is improved by the action of another (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, and Penner 2006:22)—is no more well-theorized and suffers from the same inconsistencies in research and findings.

There are, of course, exceptions to this opacity. The organizations and management literature has accumulated a great deal of information on types of organizational citizenship behavior—behaviors of employees, freely given, outside of their work obligations (Organ 1988, Borman 2004; Finkelstein 2006). Research on long-term volunteering—when time is given freely to benefit another (Wilson 2000)—is well theorized. Penner (2002:448) sees it as possessing four salient attributes: longevity, planfulness, non-obligatory in nature, and an organizational context. The causes, forms, and consequences of cooperation—when people come together to achieve a common goal (Dovidio et al. 2006)—are a mainstay in research in social psychology and economics (Fleishman 1980; Piliavin and Charng 1990). Finally, philanthropy—charitable giving and donations—is an area that has seen considerable development and streamlining, particularly in the recent review by René Bekkers and Pamala Wiepking (2007).

In the following paper we draw on research from both the more ambiguous areas, and those that are more well-defined, to pull out the pieces most useful in understanding generosity as we, and the Notre Dame Center for the Study of Religion in Society, conceptualize it, and to enhance future theoretical development in the area. First, however, it is important to define prosocial behavior and its sources, as well as to lay out the types of behavior we will draw from and the causes, forms, and consequences of each.

**Prosocial Behavior**

Behavior is considered “prosocial” when it benefits others, particularly when the benefit for that other is the primary goal (Hinde & Groebel 1991). Piliavin and colleagues (Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Clark 1981) envision prosocial behavior as actions defined by society to be beneficial to other people and the ongoing political system.² Although research on prosocial behavior began at the beginning of the

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² Muddying the conceptualization of prosocial behavior is a curious curtailment of the scope of the relevant behavior—in the literature prosocial behavior is exclusively conceptualized as freely chosen, nonobligatory helping. This omission leaves prosocial behavior such as paying taxes, support of a generous welfare state, and other state mandates such as “Good Samaritan Laws” as a research area almost entirely ignored. This lacuna in the social psychological literature leaves unexamined fascinating
twentieth century (McDougall 1908), it was a relatively inactive area of research until it took off in the mid-1960s following the death of Kitty Genovese (Penner et al. 2004). Genovese was murdered on the street outside her apartment in Queens, New York with a number of neighbors standing by, listening or watching, and doing little to help. Psychologists, in particular, wanted to explore why it was that no one did anything. What makes people act in a way that helps others, and what discourages it?

Research suggests that there are both internal and external factors in the development of prosocial tendencies—also called the prosocial personality (Penner, Fritzche, Craiger, and Freifield 1995)—and these two sources can either reinforce or challenge one another.

While internal factors include biological or genetic bases of action, social psychologists are most interested in how one’s disposition or temperament affects prosocial tendencies (Penner et al. 2004). Research in this area finds that individuals with positive emotionality or temperament are likely to engage in prosocial acts, even when distressed (Eisenberg 2000). People who are more empathetic and are better able to take the perspective of the other are also more likely to help others with no expectation of return (e.g. Batson 1991; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, and Birch 1981; Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, and Dawson 1997). In addition, people with prosocial moral reasoning, high self-efficacy, sensitivity to social norms, and moved by altruistic, rather than reward-oriented, motivations to help are more likely to be prosocial (Dovidio et al. 2006; Piliavin and Charng 1990).

External, or processual, factors of greatest interest to social psychologists with regard to prosocial tendencies are operant conditioning, modeling, and role identity (e.g. Lee, Piliavin, and Call 1999; Penner et al. 2004; Piliavin and Charng 1990). With operant conditioning, individuals can learn to be helpful and altruistic by being rewarded for such behavior and punished for not assisting others (Grusec 1991; Staub 1981). Eventually these ideas are internalized, motivation becomes intrinsic, and the external rewards and punishments are no longer required to elicit behavior (Bandura 1982). Modeling as a factor in the development of prosocialness is rooted in work on social learning theory (Bandura 1965; 1977; 1982). When children are presented with a generous model, they are more likely to be generous themselves (Lipscomb 1985). Research also shows that modeling’s effects are strongest when the role models are engaged in positive action that is rewarded rather than negative action that is sanctioned (Bandura 1965). As expected, there is a declining effect of modeling over time. Younger children are more susceptible to the influence of modeling than older children, who have already internalized social norms (Piliavin and Charng 1990). Although there can be other models in children’s lives, parents are the most influential models cited by altruistic adolescents and adults and the primary socialization agents in individuals’ lives.

questions such as explaining differences in support for state mandated prosocial activities—both within the United States and cross-nationally among western industrialized democracies.
Role identities arise from the roles in which we participate and the relationships designated to those roles. Someone can have as many role identities as they have roles—professor, mother, daughter, significant other, gardener, and so forth—and these identities, taken together, can be thought of as comprising the self (Stryker 1980). These identities are an important part of our self-concepts, and to verify these identities in interaction we fulfill the associated role expectations. For instance, one can have the identity of blood donor, volunteer, or charitable giver, and will act in altruistic ways that confirm these identities. Because of the interactional nature of these identities, their effect is enhanced by others’ expectations, modeling behaviors, and personal norms (Grube and Piliavin 2000; Lee 1997; Lee et al. 1999; Piliavin and Callero 1991).

The target, or recipient, of prosocial behavior matters as well (Michener, DeLamater, and Myers 2004). We are especially likely to come to the aid of people who we know (Amato 1990) and who we like (Kelley and Byrne 1976; Mallozzi, McDermott, and Kayson 1990), as well as people who like us (Baron 1971). We also help people who are similar to us (Dovidio 1984) — whether physically (Dovidio and Gaertner 1981; Emswiller, Deaux, and Willits 1971) or ideologically (Hornstein 1978) . Also important is our perception of someone’s deservingness of assistance. This is true whether it is an emergency (Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin 1969), when immediate action is required, or a situation where there is more time to consider the circumstances (Frey and Gaertner 1986; Weiner, Perry, and Magnusson 1988).

A brief foray into the prosocial literature shows that the variety of behaviors under the umbrella term “prosocial”—altruism, helping, organizational citizenship behaviors, philanthropy, volunteering, and cooperation—are overlapping and often confounded. For instance, altruism might be considered helping or philanthropy as altruism. Although these prosocial categories are often used interchangeably, we felt that it was important to articulate the definitions of each, as well as to highlight the forms, causes, and consequences found in the literature. Such an exercise also helps to highlight their similarities and differences.

**Altruism and Helping**

Although we combine them in this section, we see altruism and helping as two different categories of prosocial acts, albeit with significant areas of overlap (Dovidio et al. 2006). However, because this overlap is substantial and unclear enough in the research to make the two categories practically indistinguishable, for our purposes here, we cover the two in the same section. We begin with definitions of each.

Altruism is, by far, the most prevalent form of prosocial behavior in social psychological work. While muddied in literature and research, at basis, an altruistic act is an intentional act that helps another
with no benefit, and perhaps even a cost, to the one who performs it (Macaulay & Berkowitz 1970; Dovidio et al. 2006; Simmons 1991). While inherent in most definitions of altruism is the tenet that the helper must not benefit from the altruistic act, helping lacks a similar precondition. Helping is any act that one does to assist another, regardless of whether the helper benefits from the act or not. To illustrate, if one accepts the previous definitions, he or she might think of making a charitable donation as an altruistic act, which it is if there is no benefit to the giver. However, if one donates to charity and gets a tax deduction or a public note of recognition in return, such acts might be conceived of as helping behaviors rather than altruistic ones. In other words, while all successful attempts at altruism might be considered helping, all successful acts of helping are not altruistic.

It is important to note that not everyone embraces these definitions. One of the largest obstacles in conceptualizing and theorizing altruism, in our view, is an ongoing debate about the motives of altruistic behavior and if anyone ever acts outside of self interest or with no benefit to self. However, recent theory and research suggests that true altruism does exist and that it is a part of human nature (Kohn 1992; Piliavin and Charng 1990:27).

While there is both altruistically and egoistically motivated altruism (Batson 1987)\(^3\), both describe an individual sacrificing something for another:

To the degree that helping is directed toward the ultimate goal of enhancing the other’s welfare, as presumably was the Good Samaritan’s, it can be said to be altruistically motivated. To the degree that helping is directed toward the ultimate goal of enhancing the helper’s own welfare, either through providing rewards (e.g., self-esteem, a star in one’s crown) or avoiding punishments (e.g., guilt, hellfire), it can be said to be egoistically motivated (Batson, Oleson, Weeks, Healy, Reeves, Jennings and Brown 1989:873).

The close affinity of egoistically motivated altruism and helping is the primary reason why we consider the two categories so enmeshed. Once the validity of egoistic altruism was affirmed in the literature, the sharp distinction between helping and altruism mostly disappeared, though the categories persisted. The fact that helping is often used casually as a descriptor of altruistic acts in many studies further muddies distinctions between the concepts.

Another debate that continues in the altruism and helping literature is whether it is empathy (imagining the experience and feelings of the other by taking his or her perspective [e.g. Batson 1991]) or self-other merging (experiencing the suffering of another because that other is viewed as an extension of oneself [e.g. Cialidini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg 1997]) that best explains altruistic and helping actions. Unfortunately, the amount of time and energy dedicated to this debate (e.g. Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, and Dawson 1997; Cialidini et al. 1997) has likely detracted from the

\(^3\) Meier (2006) makes a similar distinction between pure and impure altruism.
progress in this field. To forge ahead we ignore the nuances of these two positions as we outline research on altruism and helping, including their causes, forms, and consequences.

**Causes of Altruism and Helping**

Following the Genovese case, research focused primarily on the situational factors that led individuals to help another in need. Such causes of short-lived altruistic behavior were first articulated in Latané and Darley’s (1970) decision model of bystander intervention: 1) an individual must notice that something is wrong, 2) must define it as an emergency, 3) decide whether or not they will take personal responsibility, 4) choose what type of help to give, and 5) determine to go ahead with the chosen course of action (Dovidio et al. 2006:68).

Other transient states that facilitate altruism are related to emotional arousal and a cost and reward analysis for helping (e.g Dovidio et al. 1991; Piliavin, Rodin and Piliavin 1969; Piliavin et al. 1981). Research finds that if one has the time and resources to help, they are more likely to do so. In addition, people will help for compensation or social rewards, and are more likely to be altruistic in circumstances where they are not exposed to physical or psychological harm or social disapproval. Individuals are especially likely to help if the victim seems deserving, in need, and similar to the potential helper, and if the individual feels a responsibility to help and will experience guilt for not offering it (Dovidio et al. 2006).

Research finds that people are more willing to act on compassion when there is some self-interested justification for the behavior (Holmes, Miller and Lerner 2002; Perlow and Weeks 2002). Because rewards, even as small as the chocolate offered at the local Goodwill, tend to increase the likelihood that an individual will help, helping behavior is more commonplace and easier to evoke than purely altruistically motivated behavior. These “self-interested” rewards vary substantially in the literature and include enhanced mood (Gueguen and De Gail 2003), popularity (Deutsch and Lambert 1986), recognition (Fischer and Ackerman 1998; Reddy 1980), reputation (Johnson, Erez, Kiker, and Motowidlo 2002), gratification (Utne and Kidd 1980), tax incentives (Wright 2002), and even a simple thank you (McGovern, Ditzian and Taylor 1975).

Unfortunately, a great deal of this research on altruism and helping focuses on individuals in transient, momentary situations, where potential helpers act as isolated individuals and not as a part of social structure (Healy 2000; Lee et al. 1999). A more sociological social psychology approach would look at the interplay between situational factors and the relatively stable dispositional and interactional sources of prosocial tendencies discussed in the previous section—the role of empathic abilities, temperament, moral reasoning, norms, identity, and so forth (Erkut, Jaquette, Staub 1981)—and would be particularly relevant for ongoing qualities or habits like generosity.
Types of Altruistic and Helping Behavior

Altruism and helping can be either short-term and spontaneous or planned and long-term (Amato and Pearce 1980). The research on long-term helping is almost exclusively in the volunteering and organizational citizenship literatures (which we will address later). Short-term helping, on the other hand, is the type most often addressed in the experimental studies by psychologists and tends to focus on helping strangers. Examples of the situations this research explores include whether a bystander would help someone who was injured or stranded, if an individual would take time to help another student solicit assistance by stuffing envelopes (Batson et al. 1997) or hanging posters (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Matoka, Johnson, and Frazier 1997), or give someone in need a portion of money they earned in an experiment (Stürmer et al. 2006). Sociologists have extensively studied blood and organ donation (Callero 1985; Healy 2000, 2006; Piliavin and Callero 1991). One exception to the trend of studying general short-term altruism for a near-stranger, Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg 1997) examined a variety of altruistic behaviors—ranging from short to long-term, trivial to costly—and also altered the target, with the person in need as a virtual stranger, acquaintance, friend, or family member. Not surprisingly, intimacy of the relationship (close friends or kin) is positively connected to being willing to engage in long-term, costly behavior.

Consequences of Altruism and Helping

Although further research is needed to explore whether, in general, people actually feel better after they have helped another, people believe that they will feel better (Dovidio et al. 2006; Wuthnow 1991). Research does indicate that helping (in the form of blood donation) lessens physiological measures of anxiety (Piliavin and Callero 1991) and increases positive feelings and feelings of satisfaction (Nilsson Sojka and Sojka 2003).

Reactions to being on the receiving end of altruism are mixed. One may feel grateful and appreciative, or discomfort with self or the relationship, or a combination of both. A model, formulated by Fisher and Nadler (Fisher, Nadler, and Whitcher-Alagna 1982; Nadler and Fisher 1986), is helpful in understanding these effects. It begins with the characteristics of the aid, donor, recipient and context to determine whether inherent in the help is self-threat (implying that the help was necessary because the recipient was somehow deficient) or self-support (which is more consistent with a recipient’s positive self-concept). The magnitude of such threat or support then influences the recipients’ self-esteem and affective and cognitive responses like positive or negative effect, evaluations of the donor, refusal or acceptance of aid offers, and so forth (Dovidio et al. 2006; Fisher et al. 1982).
Organizational Citizenship Behavior

A relative newcomer in the study of prosocial behavior, the study of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) has been particularly robust in the variety of disciplines that contribute to the organizational sciences literature. Students of organizational effectiveness were unable to account sufficiently for organization performance through analyses limited to task performance alone. To better understand effective organizations’ functioning, researchers began to consider a broader range of work contributions including “a myriad of acts of cooperation, helpfulness, suggestions, gestures of goodwill, [and] altruism” (Smith, Organ, and Near 1983: 653).

OCBs are generally conceived as having two central dimensions. First, they are behaviors that benefit the functioning of the organization; second, they are generally outside the normal expectations and reward systems of the organization (Organ 1988, Borman 2004; Finkelstein 2006). Examples of OCBs include helping new hires when your assistance is not mandated, making innovative suggestions to improve the organization’s functioning, and not breaking rules, even when one is not being supervised. Unlike most of the varieties of prosocial behaviors addressed in this paper, OCBs are typically conceived as persisting across time. In so far as research into OCBs offers insight into synchronic prosocial behavior, it may be of particular interest to attempts to better understand generosity as we have defined it. Some research distinguishes between OCBs that directly target individuals and their work in the organization (OCBIs) and those that directly target the organization itself (OCBOs) (Rioux and Penner 2001, Finkelstein 2006).

Causes of OCB

The study of OCBs has a distinctly practical cast to it, as almost exclusively industrial and organizational psychologists, business scholars, and other students of organizations have studied it. Their research reports are often directly written for workplace practitioners such as managers and human resource specialists. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, and Bachrach (2000) describe four major categories of OCB antecedents: individual, task, and organizational characteristics, as well as leadership behaviors by management.

Given the methodological individualism of psychology and other disciplines interested in OCBs, there has been extensive interest in investigating the individual attitudinal and dispositional characteristics that precede good citizen behavior (Deluga 1995; McAllister 1995; Podsakoff et al. 2000). Meta-analysis of a variety of these studies demonstrates the robustness of attitudinal factors (especially job satisfaction) while the influence of dispositional factors is mixed at best (Organ and Ryan 1995). Newer research has focused on individual motives to explain OCBs. The so-called functionalist approach—focusing on the purpose of behavior to actors—identifies three principal motives:
organizational concern (OC) “Because I care what happens to the company” (one of ten such measures for each of these primary motives), prosocial values (PV) “Because I feel it is important to help those in need,” and impression management (IM) “To look better than my co-workers,” motives, with OC being most correlated with OCBO and PV with OCBI (Rioux and Penner 2001; Finkelstein and Penner 2004).

Another branch of research has posited that leadership behaviors are primarily determinative of employee perceptions, attitudes, and performance and thereby, of OCBs (Farh, Podsakoff, Organ 1990). Competing with this thesis is the proposition that sundry task and organizational variables, or “substitutes for leadership,” influence organizational outcomes (Howell, Bowen, Dorfman, Kerr, Podsakoff 1990). The evidence adjudicating between the leadership and the substitutes of leadership theses is mixed. Some claim the substitutes of leadership hypotheses have been largely refuted, demonstrating the importance of leadership directly and de-emphasizing the importance of task and organizational variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Bommer 1996). In later work, however, Podsakoff et al. (2000) does suggest that task variables themselves are understudied and worthy of attention in the field. A recent study finds the importance of job variety and significance are significantly correlated with OCB with job satisfaction playing a mediating role between these (Chiu and Chen 2005). Other than this study, however, task variables appear to remain understudied.

Social structure is brought into the theoretical mix by research that emphasizes roles in OCBs and builds upon the work in the social psychology of identity salience hierarchies and salience’s effects on action and selfhood (McCall and Simmons 1978; Turner 1978). In a paper on principled organizational dissent—a particular form of OCB wherein individuals protest dysfunctional organizations by virtue of an appeal to an ethical principle—the authors argue that nurses have both general role identities as a nurse and specific role identities as a member of a team or unit. A more salient general role identity, with its commitment to patient care will be more likely than a salient specific role identity, with its commitment to the protection of the organization—to report health care errors (Piliavin, Grube, Callero 2002). The importance of roles has been demonstrated in a number of other OCB studies (Piliavin and Callero 1991, 2002; Grube and Piliavin 2000).

A relatively recent line of research investigates potential similar processes underlying OCB and volunteering. These studies apply both motive and role theories first applied to explain volunteering to the study of OCB (Penner 2002; Finkelstein and Penner 2004). The latest in this line of research adds motive fulfillment (whether the behavior in question satisfied the motive for doing it) to the statistical matrix and finds that fulfillment matters for OCBO but not for OCBI (Finkelstein 2006). More research needs to be done to further investigate this so called “interactionist approach” to OCB.

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4 As we shall see below, OCBs and volunteering behaviors share many structural characteristics.
Types of OCB

In addition to the aforementioned distinction between OCBOs and OCBIs, Podsakoff et al. (2000) describe and categorize a nearly bewildering variety of behaviors studied as OCBs. These include helping behavior (assistance with or prevention of work-related problems), sportsmanship (mostly related to maintenance of a good attitude in the face of diversity), organizational loyalty (defending and promoting the organization), organizational compliance (adherence to rules outside the reach of compliance measures), individual initiative (going “above and beyond” one’s duties), civic virtue (commitment to one’s responsibilities as a member of the organization), and self development (to improve one’s skills at one’s individual initiative). Future research could better specify how these behaviors interrelate and their adequacy as measures of OCBs (Podsakoff et al. 2000) as well as look for similar causal processes underlying the different behaviors.

Consequences of OCB

Compared to the antecedents of OCB, its consequences have been less studied. The consequences of OCB can be usefully grouped into individual and organizational categories. At the level of the individual, research has focused on the degree to which OCBs actually are rewarded (contra the usual definition of OCBs) by managers and the organization. For example, OCB can come to be expected and contribute to better evaluation of task performance. There seems to be moderate empirical support for OCBs becoming part of the organization’s expectations (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, Fetter 1993; Allen and Rush 1998; Allen 2006) and that management uses them unfairly to evaluate worker performance (Vigoda-Gadot 2006, 2007). More often in reading the literature, the benefit of OCBs for individuals seems to be implicitly affirmed but not demonstrated (Collett 2006, 2007). Some research suggests that evaluation of OCBs are a gendered phenomenon, meaning women’s and men’s OCBs are evaluated differently (Wayne and Cordeiro 2003; Heilman and Chen 2005; Kark and Waismel-Manor 2005; Allen 2006).

For organizations, the general theoretical claim is that the main benefit of OCBs is that they foster the effective functioning of the organization. What does it mean to be well functioning? In his early and influential work, Organ (1988) focused on whether the organization is efficient, able to secure needed resources, innovative, and adaptable. Further research has resulted in a variety of performance measures. However one conceptualizes organizational performance, the evidence of OCBs’ positive contribution to it is empirically clear (Podsakoff, Ahearne, and MacKenzie 1997; Ehrhart, Bliese, Thomas 2006) and is demonstrable in cross-cultural contexts (Lievens and Anseel 2004; Yen and Niehoff 2004).
Philanthropy

In “Understanding Philanthropy,” Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) provide a detailed review of the last fifty years of theories and research on charitable giving. In doing so, they draw on work in economics, sociology, social psychology, and marketing. Although philanthropy has many meanings (Van Til 1990), the term is often used to describe large monetary donations by individuals or organizations yet also includes more small-scale giving. Such giving is prevalent in churches and religious organizations where parishioners are encouraged to donate a small percentage (customarily 10%) of their income to charity or the church. In fact, religious charitable giving makes up the majority of the annual donations by Americans every year, exceeding all other types of philanthropy combined (James and Jones 2007; Van Slyke and Brooks 2005; White 1989) and, some argue, it continues to grow (Giving USA 1999).

Causes of Philanthropy

In an interesting argument on “giving cultures” Karen Wright (2001:411) contends that philanthropy is more common in the United States than in the United Kingdom because it is “heavily interlaced” with self-interest. As highlighted earlier, when individuals feel that they have something to gain by offering assistance, they are more likely to do so. In the United States those who give might benefit themselves through tax credits and deductions, benefits from the supported charity, or enhanced social status. Further, these types of benefits are socially approved and, in the United States, it is acceptable to be self-interested (Kohn 1992; Ray 1998; Wright 2001).

Smaller groups have organizational cultures as well and research shows that group membership is an important promoter of philanthropy. Individuals who belong to voluntary associations (i.e. church groups, fraternal and veteran groups, professional groups, or service clubs) tend to give more to secular charities (Jackson, Bachmeister, Wood, and Craft 1995). At a more micro-level, there are a number of demographic factors that increase charitable giving. These include education, income, age, subjective perceptions of one’s financial situation, employment, marital and parental status, religious affiliation and attendance, and home ownership (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Jones 2006).5 Research also finds that people who volunteer give one and a half times as much as those who do not (White 1989:69). In addition to these factors, Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) cite seven mechanisms that are most important in driving individual giving:

First is awareness of need. That is, people are more likely to help when they realize that help is needed. However, it is important to note, that this mechanism is most effective when the person in need

5 Although there is a widespread belief that race affects giving, this is not supported in the data once one controls for income (Carson 1989).
is also perceived as deserving (Miller 1977) and when potential givers feel that their help will make a
difference (Warren and Walker 1991). Related is a second motivator, solicitation. People seldom make
unsolicited contributions. They must be approached and made aware of the opportunity to give (Bryant,
Jeon-Slaughter, Kang, and Tax 2003). Third, individuals weigh the costs and benefits of helping.
Charitable giving increases when donators feel that their costs are lessened somehow, or that either they,
or a group that they belong to, are receiving a benefit—however small—from their giving (Miller 1999).
Next Bekkers and Wiepking (2007) cite altruism, conceived as “[caring] about an organization’s output,”
as a motivator in philanthropy. If it seems that an organization lacks the ability to provide for its
constituents, individuals might feel compelled to pick up the slack. In other words, people’s contributions
are inversely related to the contributions of others (Meier 2006:18). Despite this, research indicates that
“a severe cut in government funding to non-profit organizations is not likely, on average, to be made up
by donations from private donors” (Payne 1998:338).

Individuals are also concerned about reputation—or one’s social standing—and this affects
charitable giving. There is a significant amount of research suggesting that social pressure not only
affects what someone gives, but also who they give it to, and that publicly observable opportunities for
donations are particularly effective (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2007 for a review). In addition to the
social benefit of reputation, psychological benefits impact giving as well. Individuals also give to
improve their self-image and mood. Further, those with positive self-images and moods are more likely
to give.

The last two mechanisms are values and efficacy. People who help others through philanthropy
and other helping behaviors are more likely to have altruistic, prosocial, postmaterialist, or caring values
and those who feel personal and moral responsibility for the welfare of others (Bekkers and Wiepking
2007; Ray 1998). Further, people tend to give to charitable organizations that espouse values similar to
their own (Bennett 2003). With regard to efficacy, people are more likely to give if they feel that their
input is important for the cause they are supporting—that they are making a difference. When individuals
feel that their contributions are effective, they give more and give more often (Jackson and Matthews
1995; Parsons 2003).

An important caveat to these demographic factors and mechanisms is that they are not perfect
predictors. Certain factors might moderate effects. For instance, while there is evidence that religiously
active individuals give more (see Wuthnow 1991), there is evidence that Catholics give less than
Protestants (e.g. Chaves 2002; Hoge and Yang 1994). It is important to consider the interactions between
demographic factors and mechanisms to determine the most effective ways to encourage—and to
study—charitable giving.
Types of Philanthropy

Philanthropic giving varies in size (from small to large) and recipient (individual to organization). Giving of this nature varies from someone adding change to a can on the counter at the grocery store in order to assist an individual or organization, to writing a small check for one’s local foodbank or scholarship fund, to devoting large sums of one’s estate to various organizations or causes. Research suggests that while income is positively related to the amount of money donated annually, it is inversely related to the percentage of one’s income that is donated (Auten and Rudney 1990; White 1989).\(^6\) Thus, those with fewer resources tend to make the greatest sacrifices when it comes to charitable giving. Further, those with lower incomes are often ineligible for the tax-incentives that lure those with more means into donating.

Charitable giving differs from other types of prosocial behavior in that there is often a separation between the giver and the recipient because charitable donations are often made to an organization which then distributes the funds or resources procured with such funds (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). Individuals give either to a private organization (e.g. their church, the Salvation Army) or to an umbrella organization (e.g. The United Way) and those organizations distribute the funds to individuals and other service agencies. In other words, agencies in essence serve as a mediator between the helper and the helped. This type of giving relationship is particularly common when those in need are the poor and disenfranchised and is an effective way for individuals to give help, and also for individuals to receive help, in a more anonymous manner.

However, not all philanthropic gifts go to individuals in need or remain anonymous. While philanthropy includes “charity”—donations specifically designated to the poor—not all philanthropy is charity (Ostrower 1995). In fact, according to The Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, the majority of large donations (those over 50 million dollars) go to universities, private foundations, hospitals and art museums (Strom 2007) that likely use the money to improve their own facilities and will, in return, often name the new facilities after the donors. “Enlightened self-interest” (Wright 2001) drives many such donations. Gifts are often directed toward causes that the giver participates in (e.g. arts groups), or to groups or organizations with which the giver was affiliated, or benefited from, in the past (e.g. universities) because the goals of the community and the philanthropic individual seem reciprocal in nature (Wright 2001). Such gifts are the result of a moral motivation (Lee et al. 1999; Ostrower 1995).

Without exposure to or personal experience with the plight of the poor and homeless, wealthy donors of large gifts are less likely to consider those truly in need as viable recipients of their

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\(^6\) While there is a slight upturn in giving for the wealthiest segments of the population (Schervish and Havens 1998) research shows this is driven largely by the exceptional generosity of a minority rather than a general trend (Auten and Rudney 1990).
philanthropic gifts. Of course there are exceptions to this. One of the most famous is the *Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation*, founded by the leader of Microsoft. This foundation’s mission is to enhance healthcare, reduce extreme poverty, and increase availability of computers in public libraries (albeit globally, without focus on the United States) and to expand educational opportunities in the United States, particularly by providing increased access to information technology (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2007).

**Consequences of Philanthropy**

One of the key positive attributes of philanthropy—the disjuncture between the giver and receiver, which lessens the embarrassment or negative affect generated by a feeling that one cannot repay another (Dovidio et al. 2005)—is also an important drawback. Because philanthropy allows the benefactor to give without exposure to the problems which the gift is meant to alleviate, there might be reduced empathy, understanding, or an investment in public life (Jones 2006). Further, the “warm glow” (Meier 2006:19) that individuals experience after making philanthropic gifts is internal and benefits only the giver. As a result, donating allows one to be involved without being civically engaged and such declining involvement in public life may lessen the collective solving of problems.

**Volunteering**

More sociologists than psychologists have studied volunteering (Omoto and Snyder 1995:672). Consequently, the subfield of the academic study of volunteering covers more sociological territory than other prosocial categories of inquiry. A recent sociological review defines volunteering as “any activity in which time is given freely to benefit another person, group, or organization” (Wilson 2000:215-16). Whether or not volunteers may receive any benefit or compensation for their efforts is open to debate.

Some have suggested that volunteering is not likely to result from a sense of personal obligation to other individuals, unlike other forms of prosocial behavior (Omoto and Snyder 1995). Penner, a psychologist, adds that volunteering has the four salient attributes of longevity—in the sense that it is institutionalized and quite often repeated; planfulness—in that it is thought out before being done; nonobligatory—or not motivated by a concern for a particular individual with whom one has a definite social relation; and an organizational context—most volunteering is not an individual acting alone (2002: 448-450).  

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7 Finkelstein and Penner (2004) argue volunteering shares these same attributes with OCBs. We are not sure that all OCBs must share all of these attributes, for example, we are not convinced that planfulness is a necessary component of OCBs.
Certain of these attributes may vary considerably in empirical investigations of volunteering. For example, the longevity of volunteering varies dramatically, with organizations struggling to keep volunteers’ commitments over time. Also, some research (as we shall see below) investigates informal volunteering, that which occurs outside of an organizational context. The list of attributes, therefore, should not be understood as absolutely necessary, in toto, to qualify a behavior as volunteering.

Causes of Volunteering

It is useful to divide investigations into the causes of volunteering into three types: those that investigate individual factors, those that investigate social factors, and those that propose some combination of the two. Investigations into personality attributes of volunteers lack an overall coherence, covering a variety of dimensions and measures (Elshaug and Metzer 2001). These personality attributes range from trust and acceptance (Spitz and MacKinnon 1993) to extraversion (Suda and Fouts 1980, Bekkers 2007) and intuiting (Mitchell and Shuff 1995), and, finally, to empathy and helpfulness (Penner and Finkelstein 2002). Furthermore, there is certainly not agreement on measurement of traits. For example, researchers have used the Sixteen Personality Factor (Spitz and MacKinnon 1993), the Myers-Briggs Type indicator (Mitchell and Shuff 1995), or even designed their own prosocial personality battery (see Appendix A), which consists of two factors: other-oriented empathy—high scorers on this measure are empathic and feel responsibility toward others, and helpfulness—having a history of being helpful and not likely to experience personal discomfort in response to others’ need (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger and Freifeld 1995). The debate over how to measure personality’s relation to volunteering seems far from over.

Social resources are key variables in studies of volunteering. Extensive social ties are consistently correlated with increased volunteering (Jackson et al. 1995; Wilson and Musik 1997). Better social integration results in greater chances of being asked to volunteer and of saying yes (Penner et al. 2005). Wilson (2000) argues that social networks are the reasons why key demographic predictors increase volunteerism. Having greater social capital may result in greater awareness of problems and greater expectations of the effectiveness of one’s volunteering. For example, higher socioeconomic status people tend to join more organizations and be active in them (Wilson and Musik 1997). Religious people attend church more often and are more active in congregational life (Wilson and Janoski 1995).

Other demographic variables that contribute to volunteering include increasing age (Wilson 2000)—with a peak in middle age (Menchik and Wiesbrod 1987); gender—where in the United States, women are slightly more likely than men to volunteer (Wilson 2000); education—volunteering being strongly associated with level of education (Independent Sector 2002); and ethnicity—minorities being less likely to volunteer than whites (Wilson 2000). However, all of these demographic findings are
further complicated in empirical studies which find other patterns of variation within these general findings. When socioeconomic factors are controlled, for example, ethnic differences in volunteering can no longer be found (Latting 1990).

Another line of research looks into the importance of family relations to volunteering. Married people are more likely to volunteer than single people (Sundeen 1990). Marital status and children in the home have consequences for volunteering, with married people more likely than single ones to volunteer (Sundeen 1990) and children having mixed effects based on primarily parent and child variables (Wilson 2000). An interesting panel study finds that family socialization and value modeling explains community oriented volunteering (Janoski and Wilson 1995).

Recent research has begun to theorize and test both psychological and social structural impacts on volunteering. Penner (2002) offers one such model in attempting to explain sustained volunteering. It examines the mitigating variables of demographic factors, beliefs and values, prosocial personality, motives, situational factors, and organizational characteristics (see also Meier 2006), all of which influence possible movement towards sustained volunteering. The process begins with social pressure to volunteer, which, depending on mitigating variables, may lead to a decision to volunteer. That experience, combining again with all of the mitigating factors, may lead to the development of a volunteer role identity (Callero et al. 1987; Finkelstein and Penner 2004; Grube and Piliavin 2000), which in turn is the direct and proximal cause of sustained volunteering.8

Similarly, Omoto and Snyder (1995, 2002) offer a model that tries to capture contextual effects of both the volunteer agency and the broader community on the individual volunteer across time. Compared to the role identity model, however, their model is more resolutely individualist in focus. Trying to offer a more robust account of how volunteering is sustained as well as the mediating influences of moral cognition, moral identity, and social opportunity allows Matsuba, Hart and Atkins (2007) to create a nimble model that receives initial empirical support, even as many questions about such models remain unanswered. Their study stands out for its nationally representative sample, a rarity in investigations into volunteering. It is quite similar to Penner’s model (2002), though it focuses on the decision to volunteer, rather than the sustaining of volunteering, and does not include the prosocial personality concept. All of these competing (though with some degrees of conceptual overlap) models are in need of rigorous empirical testing to determine which best explain and predict empirical data.

8 Interestingly and perhaps suggestive of the generalizability of Penner’s model, Finkelstein and Brannick (2007) applied the motive/role model to instances of “informal volunteering” (that occurring outside of an organizational context) and found that disposition and role identity are important factors in establishing and maintaining volunteerism, even without an organizational context (2007).
Types of Volunteering

The study of volunteers has covered a wide range of volunteer service in a variety of organizational contexts. Studies have looked at volunteers in AIDS service organizations (Omoto and Snyder 1995; Penner and Finkelstein 1998), in hospice contexts (Mitchell and Shuff 1995), staffing of a volunteer rural tourism board (Petzelka and Mannon 2006), at a Boys and Girls Club (Spitz and MacKinnon 1993), ethnic immigrant religious groups engaging in community volunteering (Ecklund and Park 2007), and the volunteering required to run local churches (Hoge, Zech, McNamara, and Donahue 1998). These examples give an impression of the extensive variety of types of volunteering that exist.

Consequences of Volunteering

Before summarizing the research on the consequences of volunteering, two observations are in order. First, in reading the literature it is striking how many of the measures are individually based. Although the area is supposed to investigate “all forms of the productive inputs to the public household” (Wilson 2000:233), the research fails to examine a public metric. Other than summaries of the total hours or total value of the volunteering done in America, the collective consequences of volunteering are largely uninvestigated. The second observation is that the literature on the consequences of volunteering is almost exclusively focused on the results for the volunteers, not on the “beneficiaries” of the volunteering. An exception to this is a recent pilot qualitative study on the effects of volunteers on adolescents living on the street (Ronen 2006), which barely begins to scratch the surface of the subject. Like some of the rest of our prosocial behaviors in this review, the positive consequences of volunteering are presumed rather than demonstrated and investigated.

Those criticisms aside, looking at volunteering’s relationship with citizenship, one study finds that it is occasionally correlated with a broad civic commitment in some countries, but is overall inconsistent compared to the broad, consistent correlation with a family ethic of social responsibility (Flanagan, Bowes, Jonsson, Csapo, Sheblanova 1998). There have been few longitudinal studies of affects of volunteering on individual achievement; one of the few—Johnson, Beebe, Mortimer, and Snyder (1998)—found that volunteering throughout their high school career increased students’ intrinsic work values while decreasing their anticipated importance of career. Young people engaged in community services benefit from better health, are less likely to be delinquent, perform better in school, and have a stronger sense of civic identity than their non-volunteering peers (Planty, Bozick, and Regnier 2006). Volunteering has been found to help with the role-identity absences that elderly people can experience, moderating their moods and helping them maintain a sense of purpose in life (Greenfield and Marks 2004). Lum and Lightfoot (2005) found evidence of mixed effects for mental and physical health, with more consistent benefits in mental health (across such measures as self-reports of health and
wellbeing, as well as less depression) with mixed results on physical health (improved mortality rates, but no effect on physician diagnosed health problems nor rates of residence in nursing homes). Longitudinal research demonstrates that volunteering in substantial amounts (more than 100 hours per year) helps older people stay healthier by helping them maintain a feeling of productivity through their volunteering schedules (Luoh and Herzog 2002).

**Cooperation**

When people come together to work toward a common goal that will be beneficial to all, often at the cost of short-term, individual gain, they are acting cooperatively (Dovidio et al. 2006:27). The topic of cooperation is of interest to a diverse group of disciplines including economics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, organizational behavior and management, and political science (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 1995). Cooperation is a dynamic process, where individuals are continuously making a decision to sustain the cooperative effort and can drop out at any time (Ring and Van de Ven 1994).

Cooperation, although not typically analyzed in prosocial research, is an important type of altruistic behavior (Yamagishi 1995). The fact that social dilemmas—defined by a conflict between personal and collective interests (Dawes 1980; Dawes and Messick 2000)—are not typically thought of as helping behavior is a matter of the sources of cooperation. Those who study social dilemmas often focus on the nonaltruistic sources of cooperation (i.e., incentive structures or sanctions), whereas those concerned with prosocial behavior focus on the altruistic causes (i.e., concern for another’s well-being) (Yamagishi 1995:314-15). The former is referred to as the strategic approach and the latter the motivational approach. Research finds that both are important causes of cooperation and can work in tandem. Importantly, research finds that cooperation occurs more often than economists might anticipate based on a nonaltruistic, self-interest model—even in anonymous settings, where neither selective incentives nor social pressure can explain contribution to the public good (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Meier 2006).

**Causes of Cooperation**

One of the most important antecedents of cooperation is trust (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Smith et al. 1995)—with trust defined as an individual’s confidence in the good will of others in a group and a belief that others will work toward a common group goal (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Even egoists—those concerned with self-interest and not the welfare of others—will cooperate when an understanding of the long-term benefits of cooperation is coupled with trust in others (Pruiit and Kimmel 1977; Yamagishi 1995). Psychological determinants of cooperation include similarity in partners’ values,
perceived status and legitimacy of partners, and perceptions of procedural fairness (Smith et al. 1995:15). Structural determinants, on the other hand, include previous social ties with individuals, reliability and predictability of other parties, social contexts, and the number of people involved in the cooperative effort.

Meier (2006) suggests that there are four important conditions for prosocial behavior. The first is institutional framing. Even minor changes in the way that one asks for another’s help can yield significant differences in cooperation. Although this has yet to be carefully explored by economists, it is likely that successful frames contain information about social norms and expected intentions of others involved. The second condition is conditional cooperation. In other words, cooperation is dependent on what others are doing. Contrary to the “crowding out” effects specified by the pure economic altruists (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007), research (Meier 2006:136) finds that individuals increase contributions to the group as the average group contribution increases. Monetary incentives also increase cooperation, but only for individuals who are already inclined to act prosocially. Individuals who are self-interested, on the other hand, assume that they are still better off not contributing to a common good (even with provisions to reduce the cost of the helping). Finally, education is an important condition for cooperation. More educated individuals are more likely to cooperate, but those who study economics—particularly business administration—are the least likely to. However, research (Meier 2006) suggests that this is a selection effect and not a result of training in economics.

A significant amount of research has explored the role of communication in facilitating cooperation (see Dawes 1990 for a review) and results suggest that communication’s contribution to cooperation is mainly that it induces commitments to cooperate (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliliand 1994; Meier 2006). Individuals believe that if people agree to cooperate beforehand they will be more likely to follow through with said action, even if defecting is the most beneficial route to take. Discussions also enhance a sense of group identity by making the collective rather than the individual the referent (Dawes et al. 1990) or invoking a consideration of the welfare of the group (Caporeal, Dawes, Orbell, and van de Kragt 1989). The salience of a group identity facilitates cooperation, and findings show that “social identity accounts for variance above and beyond that accounted for by the discussion treatment” (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliliand 1994:522).

Types of Cooperation

Cooperation impacts all domains where voluntary compliance matters. It shapes interactions in families, neighborhoods, schools, organizations, markets, and politics (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003). Research distinguishes between formal and informal, and vertical and horizontal, types of cooperation (Smith et al. 1995). Cooperation is informal if cultural and social norms guide cooperative behavior (e.g.
reading and commenting on the work of colleagues) and formal when it results from contractual obligations and formal control structures (e.g. reviewing proposals for a National Science Foundation panel). Cooperation between members of a specific group can at times be formal and can eventually lose formality, or the reverse can occur and formal controls are necessary to preserve once informal relationships (Gulati 1995; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). In a vertical relationship a supervisor and subordinate might cooperate, or individuals at the top and bottom levels of an organization (Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza 1995). In horizontal cooperation, on the other hand, individuals in similar positions or of similar status work together for the collective good (Wagner 1995).

Consequences of Cooperation

Cooperation tends to have positive economic and psychological benefits for those involved (Blau 1964). First, cooperating tends to lead to positive affective states (Meier 2006). Further, recent research suggests that working together as a group tends to promote group solidarity and increase trust, positive affective regard, perceived unity and sense of commitment to the group (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007). Clearly these positive benefits impact individuals, relationships, small groups, organizations, institutions, and cultures, but there is more work to be done in determining the tangible benefits of cooperation across these levels.

Conceptualizing Generosity

We now turn our attention to generosity. We believe that generosity, as the disposition of freely giving one’s time, talents, and treasure to others, is a unique variant of prosocial behavior. We are convinced that prosocial, with its more neutral connotations, is the appropriate term to cover both obligatory and voluntary behavior oriented to the welfare of others. Generosity, on the other hand, with its connotations of noble and magnanimous motivations, is a more appropriate term for freely given assistance to others. 9 Because we envision generosity as a disposition, it is unilateral—emanating from an individual — by definition. It can help individuals or groups and may foster reciprocity, cooperation, and benefit the common good.

9 While we realize that those who study prosocial behavior generally include only voluntary behavior in their analyses, we argue that acts can be prosocial with varying levels of voluntariness (paying taxes is different than tithing the expected 10% is different than freely donating one’s estate to their church). For an act to be prosocial, it must only benefit others. For an act to be generous, it must be freely given to benefit others. Future research should parse these differences out more carefully and recognize the importance of even non- or less-voluntary types of prosocial behavior (see Planty, Bozick, and Regnier 2006 for an example).
Like altruism, there is no expectation of anything in return for generosity. However, there are likely altruistically and egoistically motivated versions of generosity and, like helping, generosity is still generosity when an individual benefits from giving. Generosity is not restricted to acts (organizational citizenship behavior), goods (philanthropy), service (volunteering), or group behavior (cooperation), and applies to any of those categories. Despite these similarities, we see generosity as unique in that it is situated in the individual rather than the act.\(^{10}\) Despite the importance of the individual in this line of inquiry, social psychology has little to offer with regard to generosity.

In addition to formally conceptualizing generosity, we see a significant area for growth in the social psychological study of generosity: researchers must locate generosity in social selves. There are two important avenues to pursue in achieving this. First, as stated above, our understanding of generosity research must move away from situational explanations of prosocial behavior and toward more stable characteristics of individuals. Further, we argue that when thinking about the sources of stable characteristics, it is important to explore those that are created and sustained in interaction (Callero 1985; Lee et al. 1999; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Stryker 1980)—that are more malleable than temperament—and to capitalize on the potential of sociological social psychology in understanding how to foster these.\(^{11}\) An important part of this, and the second potential contribution of sociological social psychology to this, is a consideration of the impact of social structure, including groups and institutions, on generosity and prosocial behavior more generally (Healy 2000, 2006; Lee et al. 1999; Meier 2006; Wright 2001).

**The Generous Individual**

If there is such a thing as a prosocial personality (Penner et al. 1995, see Appendix A), as argued by social psychologists in this area, there is most certainly a generous personality. This personality might serve as an underlying orientation that can lead to a variety of generous behaviors and actions, which likely vary with social location, throughout a person’s lifespan. However, the current focus on particular varieties of prosocial behavior obscures this underlying tendency. A generous individual may create a study group in high school, volunteer in college, donate to charity as a young professional, and return to volunteering as a parent or retired professional. Thinking of generosity as an underlying disposition

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\(^{10}\) Arguably all prosocial behavior is rooted in the individual and could benefit from an increased attention to stable social psychological processes that foster prosocial traits rather than the transient situational cues that promote prosocial acts.

\(^{11}\) Although there is a significant amount of work on the social psychology of prosocial behavior (see Dovidio et al. 2006 for a review), sociological social psychology, with its unique view of the importance of the self as both a social actor and social object (Mead 1934), is underrepresented.
towards these types of behaviors opens up a whole new research frontier: the study of an overall generous nature and the determinants of these various manifestations of generosity.

We see the study of role identity and prosocial behavior (Callero 1985; Dovidio et al. 2006; Finkelstein and Brannick 2007; Lee et al. 1999; Piliavin and Callero 1991) as an important starting place in understanding the social psychology of generosity. Stryker (1980:60) defines role identities as “internalized positional designations [that] exist insofar as the person is a participant in structured role relationships.” A woman sees herself as a mother in relation to her child and that relationship carries with it expectations of self-sacrifice and caretaking on the part of the mother. Other role identities directly engender generosity as well—volunteer, donor, giver, and sponsor—and still others do so indirectly, such as friend, partner, and teacher. One’s self-designation as “generous” can also affect the role identities one chooses or how he or she enacts current role identities. For instance, someone who views being generous as a significant aspect of his or her self might enact a parental identity differently than someone who views his or her most salient traits as being independent or driven (not that any of these are mutually exclusive). Research (Gruber and Piliavin 1997) suggests that both general role identities (e.g. volunteer) and specific role identities (e.g. American Cancer Society volunteer) are important predictors of the number of hours donated to organizations and the desire to remain an active volunteer. When an individual views an identity as central, he or she engages in behavior that confirms that identity (Snow and Anderson 1987). A sense of self emerges from repeated role enactments and increased opportunities for generosity should solidify one’s role identity as a “generous” person. As the role becomes an important part of the individuals’ self-concept, he or she will continue to enact the role without outside influences (Callero, Howard, and Piliavin 1987).

The likelihood that behavior consistent with this identity takes place is also affected by social networks (surrounding oneself with likeminded individuals) (Callero 1985), whether one’s self view is threatened in any way and there is a need for identity support (Michener et al. 2004), and situational opportunities to enact that identity (Kenrick, McCreath, Govern, King, and Bordin 1990).

The role identity most often studied in the prosocial literature is that of a blood donor (e.g. Callero 1985; Piliavin and Callero 1991), but has also been applied to intention to make charitable donations and to volunteer (Grube and Piliavin 2000; Lee et al. 1999). Research finds that the salience of a role identity is strongly related to all three of those prosocial behaviors (Lee et al. 1999). The role identities, in turn, originate from three factors: others’ expectations of oneself, modeling of that role behavior, and personal norms. Each of these is significantly situated in social psychological theory and inquiry.

Others’ expectations of oneself—the way one’s parents, friends, mentors, and others imagine he or she should behave—significantly impact all of our social actions. Cooley (1902) suggests that this
stems from “the looking-glass self” where we imagine how we appear to others, imagine others’ judgment of that appearance, and develop our self through that judgment. If we believe that others think we are generous, and that they believe that is something we should feel proud of, we feel pride at our generosity and continuously work to live up to those expectations and each aspect—generosity and pride—becomes an important part of our sense of self (Yeung and Martin 2003).

Work in prosocial behavior demonstrates the importance of modeling as well (Bandura 1965; 1977; 1982). When others demonstrate acts of kindness, we do the same (Lipscomb 1985). The effect is particularly pronounced for young children (Piliavin and Charng 1990) and most pronounced when the role models are positive and highly regarded by the young people (Bandura 1965). Generosity, while likely tied to temperament like altruistic tendencies, also likely originates from models of such behavior. Although there can be other models in children’s lives, parents are the most influential models cited by altruistic adolescents and adults and the primary socialization agents in individuals’ lives.

Although parents are the most influential models in most people’s lives, another source of behavior to model is individuals, other than parents, from whom people benefit directly. An interesting thing about blood donation, versus the gift of time and money, is the importance of past receipt in predicting future donation. When someone has received blood, they are more likely to give it. Frank (2004:1) asserts that this is true of generosity in general and that humanity “seems to be the most generous when we feel grateful and desire to pass on some measure of what we have been given.”

This influence of others, whether through modeling, conditioning, or internalization, impacts our personal norms and these personal norms subsequently drive our behavior. Personal norms—feelings of moral obligations to perform specific actions (Michener et al. 2004:255)—stem from our internalized values. We acquire these values from our position in the social structure and relationships in which we are embedded (Rokeach 1975). Personal norms are distinct from cultural norms like those of social responsibility (we know what we ought to do in certain situations [Berkowitz 1972]) and reciprocity (that we should help those who have helped us [Gergen, Ellsworth, Maslach and Siepel 1975]), although both types affect helping behavior.

The Social Nature of Generosity

In addition to locating generosity in the individual, we need to properly specify the social origin of role identities and subsequent behavior in social groups. Penner and colleagues (2005:384-85) call for a widening of the lens through which we understand prosocial behavior so that we can see it both as part of ongoing processes and how group context can change prosocial behavior dramatically. We, too, look for a widening of the lens of social psychology in the study of generosity.
There has been a trend in psychology, generally, and psychological social psychology, particularly, towards an increased attention both empirically and theoretically, towards the social determinants of individual and group behavior (Nye and Brower 1996). One dimension of import for this sociological move across social psychology is a more expansive, social conception of the self. There are various languages to suggest that people are simply not atomistic selves opposed to social entities. Rather, people are both constrained and enabled by their conceptions of social identity as much as they are by their personal identities. Forsyth and Kelley (1996) refer to this distinction as one in which members have either a “sociocentric” or “egocentric” focus. We believe that future work investigating generosity must not reproduce the individualized bias of much social psychological investigation of the last five decades and consequently under-account for the social, group-level determinants of a number of important independent variables they identify.

Beyond social identities, an interest in the study of the impact of groups has been revived recently (see Fine and Harrington 2004; Harrington and Fine 2000, 2006) with the argument that small groups unite culture and the individual—that they are “where the action is” (Harrington and Fine 2006:4). People’s lives and behavior are greatly shaped by the varying interactions and groups in which they find themselves. Our methods should try to reflect this basic social fact. This could be done quite easily with a number of common social science methodologies.

We believe this line of inquiry offers great potential for analytic and empiric progress in our understanding of the ways in which the embedding of people in social groups matters for generous behavior. Groups are the social context for our role identities and the primary substrate of our socialization. They provide the space for the development of our individual and social selves and are the venue in which we learn behaviors and acquire values, often from socially similar others. Institutions and organizations must be aware of how they frame opportunities for prosocial behavior and realize and harness the power they have over individual action (Healy 2000, 2006; Meier 2006).

The above consideration of generosity in individuals with different role identities who are influenced by various group affiliations points us toward a rethinking of the antecedents of generosity for future work. Moving away from situational tests and analyses, we should begin to look towards the various group interactions, the understanding of exchange they enact, and the varieties of role identities they engender. We delve more specifically into suggestions for future research in the next section.
Future Directions

While a great deal of work has been done to explore the prosocial self and the forms it takes, there is a great deal left to be done. In addition to the need for future research to conceptualize generosity more fully—which we believe will incorporate heavily the ideas of role identity and identity theory and will consider the impact of other aspects of social structure including groups and institutions—scholars must consider three other important issues. First, there must be attention given to the theoretical differences in the types of resources individuals share with others and the reasons they do so. Second, researchers must more carefully consider the methods and measurement used in this research. Finally, there must be increased attention to the effects of prosocial action.

Resource Characteristics

An area that has recently received significant attention concerns the cognitive and affective outcomes of social exchange, particularly as related to the type of exchange and the relationship between partners (e.g. Lawler 2001; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2006, 2007; Molm Schaefer and Collett 2007, Molm, Takahashi and Peterson 2000, 2003). There is also an emerging interest in the importance of the attributes of the resources exchanged—specifically the duplicability and transferability of resources (Schaefer 2006, 2007). A resource is duplicable if it is retained by its provider and can be used in a subsequent exchange, and transferable if it can be exchanged by its recipient. We recreate Schaefer’s table (2007:146) to illustrate how these dimensions can be applied to various types of generosity.

While there is significant overlap in the causes, forms, and consequences of the various types of helping behavior there are distinctions as well. This is perhaps best seen in Lee and colleagues’ (1999) discussion of the donation of time, money, and blood. If one classifies volunteering as non-transferable and non-duplicable (like the gift of time), and charitable donations as non-duplicable and transferable (like the gift of treasure), then blood donation, which is arguably duplicable and non-transferable (like talent, for it is unique to the individual, something that only they can give), it’s possible to imagine that they are facilitated by different causes, occur in different types of relationships and create different outcomes (Schaefer 2006). Our review earlier supports this and future research should explore these differences systematically.

| Table 1. Typology of Resource Types, by Transferability and Duplicability (Schaefer 2007) |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Nontransferable                 | Nonduplicable    | Duplicable       |
| Transferable                    | Volunteer Hours, Organ Donation | Blood           |
|                                 | Donations (Money/Goods)         | Ideas, Advice, Information |
Methods and Measurement

Experiments allow for claims of causality via manipulation of independent variables. Such gains in control, however, can come at the unfortunate cost of increasing threats to ecological validity. Though these costs of experimental research are well known (and not worth repeating here), one particular cost of experimental research deserves further explication in this context: that of the social determination of the conditions in the real world—largely via the influence of groups—of those conditions set by the experimenter in the laboratory. Experimental methods could be sociologically richer by the inclusion of group influences as independent variables in experimental design and control. These could range from inclusion of potential group contexts and demands being part of experimental manipulations to eliciting salient group identifications from subjects and incorporating them as variables to manipulate to the once popular hiring of confederates in more elaborate experimental designs.

Survey methods could be similarly improved. As we have conceptualized generosity, synchronic data gathering is a particularly inapt way to collect information that could capture both the variety of ways in which people are generous and the manner in which they persist in being so. The palliative to this problem is rigorous, sensitive panel data that gets at the multiple dimensions of prosocial behaviors we have outlined above and can accurately track changes in type and level of generosity across time. Certainly this is within the reach of current survey techniques and is just awaiting interested researchers, subtle survey instruments, and the proper institutional funding for the data collection.

But improving survey techniques is not limited to longitudinal data only. Diachronic survey data can also be made more sensitive to the social influences of individual action. To consider the current limitations and prospects for improvement of a survey-based measure of personality predisposition to prosocial behavior, let us consider in some detail the Citizen Motives Scale (CMS)—developed specifically to tease out the dispositional motives towards organizational citizenship behavior (Rioux and Penner 2001). The CMS identifies three principal factors in motivation toward OCBs: Organizational Concern, Prosocial Values, and Impression Management. Respondents to the CMS are first given a definition of OCBs as well as several behavioral examples of OCBs. Then, they rate how important each of the motive statements (in see Appendix B) would be in their decision to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors at a job.

Examining the twenty questions used to measure organizational concern and prosocial values we notice the ubiquity of first-person singular pronouns. Only one of the twenty questions does not include an “I” or “me.” This linguistic clue bears the imprint of a personality approach that sees stable qualities as inhering distinctly in the individual. What it fails to capture is the degree to which people have multiple selves because of their multiple identity roles and the degree to which behavior is driven by relative identity salience. Just imagine two relatively common—and often conflicting—identifications of
employees: organization member and family member, both of which have potentially dramatic impact for people either a) doing OCBs (or not), and b) their motives for whatever their action is. The CMS is blind to this most basic of role inconsistencies. Imagine how the response to the last organizational concern question (“Because I am committed to the company”) may vary depending on differences in the identity salience of worker versus parent. When one’s work identity is particularly salient, as it likely is when one is taking a survey about work, one would get a very different score on this measure than when one’s family identity is salient, which arguably might occur throughout the day when individuals are most likely to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors. It is not sufficient to argue that identity is context dependent, that, at work, one’s work identity is salient and, at home, one identifies with family. Though context is a primary influence on identity salience, it is not the only one. In the real world, salience is in no small part a function of fairly stable identity hierarchies, and the tension between one’s commitments to home and work are certainly likely to be salient when opportunities for extra work present themselves in the form of OCBs. Future research should consider these issues carefully and work diligently to include identity salience and commitment into analyses. We should determine if, and how, identities impact one’s likelihood of engaging in prosocial behavior and whether they affect the types of helping individuals choose to participate in.

Exploring the Consequences of Generous Behavior

Throughout our inventory of the research on prosocial behaviors, there has been a noticeable lag in investigating and understanding the consequences of these behaviors. It seems that the benefits of these behaviors are more assumed than demonstrated. Most current research also ignores the possibility that the short and long-term effects of prosocial behavior might be different. For instance, Planty and colleagues (Planty et al. 2006) find that involuntary prosocial behavior (in the form of court-ordered community service) increases the likelihood that an adolescent would volunteer in the short term, but this effect does not last past college.

Furthermore, there is no empirical testing of the consequences of various behaviors even within the same type of behaviors. For example, it is unknown whether OCBIs or OCBOs actually contribute more to an organization’s effectiveness. Similarly, it remains unclear whether informal volunteering is more, less, or equally helpful to beneficiaries than formal volunteering. How does private philanthropy contribute to the public good compared to more generous social provisions by governments? While we still differentiate between helping and altruism (albeit rather inconsistently), research is currently unable to tell us how the consequences of each are similar or different. All of these worthy questions remain unanswered. Though tracking data on consequences of generous and prosocial behavior is probably a bit harder to collect than antecedents of that behavior, we believe the problems are not insurmountable and
worthy of investment in terms of expanding our knowledge base of the full cycle of generosity that we can both find and encourage in the world.

Conclusion

Our goal was to explore the social psychology of generosity. With so little published research about generosity specifically, and so much out there about prosocial behavior, we started by simply outlining what prosocial behavior is and the explanations we currently have for why it exists. We then briefly covered the causes, forms, and consequences of prosocial behavior’s major permutations—altruism, helping, philanthropy, volunteering, organization citizenship behavior, and cooperation—and articulated our own conceptualization of generosity. The sociological social psychological definition of generosity incorporates the importance of social structure in two ways—first by capitalizing on the idea that role and social identities are key to our understanding of generous action, and, second, that groups and institutions are important transmitters of the values, beliefs, and norms that guide and facilitate acts of kindness. We then discussed three additional areas for future research to consider—the characteristics of the prosocial actions or goods and how these might impact the causes and consequences of giving, the experimental methods and survey measurements currently used in prosocial research, and expanding our purview to better explore the consequences of various types of prosocial behavior and generosity. We find that while there is a wealth of information out there about individuals helping others, the research and literature lacks the integration and conceptualization necessary for theoretical growth in the field. Although we argue in this paper for more differentiation in consideration of the types of prosocial behaviors, we believe that such clarification is a fruitful starting point for what will ultimately lead to a more holistic and rich understanding of prosocial behavior and generosity of all kinds.
Appendix A. Prosocial Personality Battery (PSB)

**PART 1:**
Below are a number of statements which may or may not describe you, your feelings or your behavior. Please read each statement carefully and blacken in the space on your answer sheet which corresponds to choices presented below. There are no right or wrong responses.

Use the following scale to indicate your answer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree (1)</th>
<th>Agree (2)</th>
<th>Uncertain (3)</th>
<th>Disagree (4)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Social Responsibility Items (Schwartz and Howard, 1982)**

1. If a good friend of mine wanted to injure an enemy of theirs, it would be my duty to try to stop them. (R)
2. I wouldn't feel that I had to do my part in a group project if everyone else was lazy. (R)
3. When people are nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat them well. (R)
4. I would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than in a clean one. (R)
5. No matter what a person has done to us, there is no excuse for taking advantage of them. (R)
6. You can't blame basically good people who are forced by their environment to be inconsiderate of others. (R)
7. No matter how much people are provoked, they are always responsible for whatever they do. (R)
8. Being upset or preoccupied does not excuse people for doing anything they would ordinarily avoid. (R)
9. As long as business people do not break laws, they should feel free to do their business as they see fit. (R)
10. Occasionally in life people find themselves in a situation in which they have absolutely no control over what they do to others. (R)
11. I would feel obligated to do a favor for someone who needed it, even though they had not shown gratitude for past favors. (R)
12. With the pressure for grades and the widespread cheating in school nowadays, the individual who cheats occasionally is not really as much at fault. (R)
13. It doesn't make much sense to be very concerned about how we act when we are sick and feeling miserable. (R)
14. If I broke a machine through mishandling, I would feel less guilty if it was already damaged before I used it. (R)
15. When you have a job to do, it is impossible to look out for everybody's best interest. (R)

**Empathy Items (from Davis, 1980)**

16. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. EC
17. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other person's" point of view. PT (R)
18. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. EC (R)
19. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. PD
20. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. PT
21. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. EC
22. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective. PT
23. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. EC (R)
24. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments. PT (R)
25. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. PD
26. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them. EC (R)
27. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. PD (R)
28. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. EC
29. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. PT
30. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. EC
31. I tend to lose control during emergencies. PD
32. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in their shoes" for a while. PT
33. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. PD
34. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. PT

**PART 2:**

Below are a set of statements which may or may not describe how you make decisions when you have to choose between two courses of action or alternatives when there is no clear right way or wrong way to act. Some examples of such situations are: being asked to lend something to a close friend who often forgets to return things; deciding whether you should keep something you have won for yourself or share it with a friend; and choosing between studying for an important exam and visiting a sick relative. Read each statement and blacken in the space on your answer sheet which corresponds to the choices presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree (1)</th>
<th>Agree (2)</th>
<th>Uncertain (3)</th>
<th>Disagree (4)</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35. My decisions are usually based on my concern for other people.</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. My decisions are usually based on what is the most fair and just way to act.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. I choose alternatives that are intended to meet everybody's needs.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. I choose a course of action that maximizes the help other people receive.</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. I choose a course of action that considers the rights of all people involved.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. My decisions are usually based on concern for the welfare of others.</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. My decisions are usually based on my personal principles about what is fair and unfair.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. I choose alternatives that minimize the negative consequences to other people.</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART 3:**

Below are several different actions in which people sometimes engage. Read each of them and decide how frequently you have carried it out in the past. Blacken in the space on your answer sheet which best describes your past behavior. Use the scale presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Never (1)</th>
<th>Once (2)</th>
<th>More than Once (3)</th>
<th>Often (4)</th>
<th>Very Often (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Social Psychology of Generosity
SRA Past Helpfulness (from Rushton et al., 1981)

43. I have given directions to a stranger.
44. I have made change for a stranger.
45. I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it).
46. I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.
47. I have done volunteer work for a charity.
48. I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (e.g., books, parcels, etc.).
49. I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger.
50. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a line (e.g., supermarket, copying machine, etc.)
51. I have given a stranger a lift in my car.
52. I have let a neighbor whom I didn't know too well borrow an item of some value (e.g., tools, a dish, etc.).
53. I have bought 'charity' Christmas cards deliberately because I knew it was for a good cause.
54. I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with a homework assignment when my knowledge was greater than his or hers.
55. I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor's pets or children without being paid for it.
56. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.

Scoring Instructions: Compute scores for 7 individual scales: Social Responsibility (SR), Empathic Concern (EC), Perspective Taking (PT), Personal Distress (PD), Other-Oriented Moral Reasoning (O), Mutual Concerns Moral Reasoning (M), Self-Reported Altruism (SRA). Factor 1, Other-Oriented Empathy, = sum of scores on SR, EC, PT, O, M. Factor 2, Helpfulness, = sum of PD (reversed) and SRA.
Appendix B. Citizenship Motives Scales (Penner and Rioux 2001)

Organizational Concern:
- Because I want to understand how the organization works.
- Because I care what happens to the company.
- Because I want to be fully involved in the company.
- Because I feel pride in the organization
- Because the organization values my work.
- Because I have a genuine interest in my work.
- To keep up with the latest developments in the organization.
- Because the organization treats me fairly.
- Because I am committed to the company.

Prosocial Values:
- Because I feel it is important to help those in need.
- Because I believe in being courteous to others.
- Because I am concerned about other people's feelings.
- Because I want to help my co-workers in any way I can.
- Because it is easy for me to be helpful.
- Because I like interacting with my co-workers.
- To have fun with my co-workers.
- To get to know my co-workers better.
- To be friendly with others.
- Because I can put myself in other people's shoes.

Impression Management:
- To avoid looking bad in front of others.
- To avoid looking lazy.
- To look better than my coworkers.
- To avoid a reprimand from my boss.
- Because I fear appearing irresponsible.
- To look like I am busy.
- To stay out of trouble.
- Because rewards are important to me.
- Because I want a raise.
- To impress my coworkers.
References


