Religion and Public goods provision: Evidence from Catholicism and Islam

Carolyn M. Warner, Political Science, Arizona State University
Ramazan Kilinc, Political Science, University of Nebraska, Omaha
Christopher Hale, Political Science, Arizona State University
Adam Cohen, Psychology, Arizona State University

contact authors:
Warner cwarner@asu.edu
Kilinc rkilinc@unomaha.edu

DRAFT

Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle WA, Sept. 1-4, 2011.

Copyright American Political Science Association.

Religion and Public goods provision: Evidence from Catholicism and Islam

What are the institutional and spiritual mechanisms which enable religious communities to produce public goods? With the collapse of many states and the retrenchment of social services, much recent political science research has asked what fosters provision of public goods outside of state or government. However, organized religions have an ambiguous status in research on civil society, with some scholars conceptualizing and analyzing them as components, and others excluding them. Our project advances the study of public goods provision and group cooperation in political science by giving sustained and systematic attention to the causal properties of Catholicism and Islam as producers of generous behavior. What specific religious beliefs and institutions promote generosity? Do these vary across religious traditions?

This paper will focus on these questions, using data from field research conducted in Milan, Paris, Dublin and Istanbul and derived from semi-structured interviews with religious community members, and religious leaders in Dublin and Istanbul. Italy, France and Ireland have been and remain crucial to the history and life of the Catholic Church and Catholicism; Turkey is a leading Islamic country, with a significant role in Islam's history. We argue that religious communities produce public goods through mobilizing their spiritual and institutional repertoire. A number of factors significantly influence generosity of individual members: individual's relation to his or her religious community and his or her experience of its rituals; the religion's institutional capacity to get its members involved in charitable activities; and national social welfare policies. We use this study of generosity within Catholicism and Islam to test several propositions derived from the literature on public goods provision. We also use this study to test what the mechanisms for public and club goods provision within the two religions are—what aspects of their theology and rituals, of their community and institutional structures, promote public goods provision? We suggest that not only do organized religions provide sanctions and incentives through their theologies and institutional structures, but these same theologies and institutional structures can also elicit the pro-social tendencies of individuals. Both religions have institutional structures and belief systems that facilitate generosity, the providing of public goods at a cost in time and expense and effort to oneself. For these two mainstream religions, neither one has strong sanctioning or monitoring systems; Islam perhaps has a stronger one than Catholicism, but neither religion could be characterized as being a strict sect.
The paper assesses these factors through analysis of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires, and case study materials in order to further assess various hypothesized causal mechanisms.

Religion and Public goods provision: Evidence from Catholicism and Islam[1]

With the collapse of many states and the retrenchment of social services, much recent political science research has asked what fosters the provision of public goods outside of state or government. With the exception of Putnam's classic work (1993), which dismissed the possibility of a major world religion, Catholicism, from having a role in providing public goods of a sort ("social capital"), most work has focused on ethnic or kin relations, not on religion. This work has been oriented towards whether and how ethnic group relations create quid pro quos or obligations within the group that foster public goods provision for the group or with other groups, and sometimes in the absence of a functional state apparatus (Tsai 2007; Habyarimana et al 2007; Eckstein 2001; Scott 2010??). Rationalist approaches have made progress in understanding why and how religious extremists provide public goods, but those have given little attention to the causal mechanisms leading mainstream believers to provide them goods (Berman and Laitin 2008; Iannaccone and Berman 2006). Another strand of scholarship has focused on whether a generous welfare state "crowds out" the giving tendencies of the faithful (Hungerman 2005; Andreoni and Payne 2009; Gill & Lundesgaard 2004), but has not assessed the means by which or the reasons why the faithful might give in the first place. We argue that religions, here Catholicism and Islam, facilitate public goods provision through their spiritual repertoire and institutional structures.

What are the institutional and spiritual mechanisms that enable religious communities to produce public goods? Our study advances the understanding of public goods provision and group cooperation by giving sustained and systematic attention to the causal properties of Catholicism and Islam as producers of public goods. We suggest that there are mechanisms within the two religions that help individuals overcome classic collective action dilemma of free-riding, but also that there are mechanisms in the two religions that circumvent free-riding. Religion may play a role in enabling individuals to move beyond operating out of strict motives of self-interest while eliciting pro-social tendencies, reflective of behavior that is commonly defined as "generosity." In doing so, we challenge the traditional notions of what are considered to be "sanctions" and "incentives" in the rational choice literature. This project has collected novel data from two of the world's largest world religions, Catholic Christianity and Sunni Islam to examine how they elicit the provision of public goods and pro-social behavior from their believers.

This paper uses data from field research conducted in Milan, Paris, Dublin and Istanbul derived from semi-structured interviews with and surveys of religious community members, religious leaders, and from in-field experiments with university students and religious community members in Dublin and Istanbul. Italy, France and Ireland have been and remain crucial to the history and life of the Catholic Church and Catholicism; Turkey is a leading Muslim country, with a significant role in Islam's history. Although both religions encourage

[1] ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: We thank Matthew E. Bergman and Angela Pirlott for research assistance, and the University of Notre Dame/Templeton Foundation Science of Generosity Program for their generous support of this research. It goes without saying that we could not have done this research without the Program's support, nor without the kindness and cooperation of the religious officials who allowed access to their religious communities. To the numerous private individuals of those communities who so graciously agreed to be interviewed (and observed in their normal religious-based activities), we also express our sincere gratitude.

charitable acts, and the examples of primary religious figures from each are held as behavioral standards, Catholicism and Islam also differ in important ways. Whereas Catholicism is a hierarchical, centralized religion, Islam is a non-hierarchical, decentralized religion, and these institutional differences may affect generosity dynamics. Catholicism is a majority religion in Western Europe and minority in Turkey, whereas Islam is a minority religion in Western Europe, and majority in Turkey. The hierarchical structure within which each Catholic Church is embedded may create a disengagement between the parishioners and the leadership, and between the parishioners and their sense of responsibility for and identification with the life of the community (cf. Eastis 1998). Although each Islamic organization or mosque may have some formal internal structures, the structures place more responsibility on individuals for sustaining the life of the mosque/organization. The engagement fostered by this responsibility might, in part, encourage Muslims to be more generous. On the other hand, the strongly articulated structures of the Catholic Church may enable it to mobilize parishioners for charitable giving in a way that less centralized movements in Islam cannot. Moreover, though New Testament texts "suggest strongly the centrality of giving and service to the religious life," as do other Church teachings (Queen 1996, 27; Catechism 1999, 461)), Catholicism has no formal call to giving as a sacrament of the faith. In contrast, Islam has several explicitly described institutions of charity; the most well-known is the obligatory zakat (alms-giving), one of the five pillars of Islam (Clark 2004, 8; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 7-44; Kozlowski 1998; Al-Ghazzali 1966).

In recent decades, there has been tinterest in the United States in whether faith based organizations (FBOs), including organized religions, can deliver state-funded welfare services as well as or better than secular organizations (cf. Fischer 2008 and Ferguson et al. 2007). Additional scholarship has suggested that as the welfare state retrenches, FBOs will pick up the slack. Research on both perspectives has largely ignored how faith and the religious organization might enable a religious group to provide public goods or what the role of faith and religious organization structure is in the existence and success of the activity. Our paper addresses this gap by providing systematic information on what motivates religious people (in two religions) to volunteer in or give to faith-based "welfare" activities, and what kinds of institutional structures in those religions exist for delivery of welfare services. That said, we need to be clear that we are not trying to test the effectiveness of faith-based initiatives, nor even the perspective that as the welfare state retrenches, FBOs can fill in and do the job.

We argue that religious communities produce public goods through mobilizing their spiritual and institutional repertoire, and a number of factors significantly influence the generosity, or the willingness to engage in the production of public goods, of individual members. By spiritual repertoire, we mean the individual's relation to his or her religious community and his or her experience with its rituals and teachings; a religious community's institutional repertoire is its institutional structures and belief systems.These potentially give the religion a means of getting members involved in charitable activities and monitor contributions. Catholicism and Islam provide common and contrasting features that provide opportunities to test several new theoretical models of public goods provision by organized religions.[2]

We use this study of generosity within Catholicism and Islam to test several propositions

[2] "Islam" throughout refers to Sunni Islam, the major branch to which about 80% of the world's Muslims adhere. The Shi`ah branch of Islam is more centralized and it is far less present in Europe. We recognize the controversy of including Turkey in "Europe" (Kalsson 2009; Navaro-Yashin 2002, 46-51; Roy 2005).

derived from the literature on public goods provision. In doing so, we develop the distinctions between public and club goods that are sometimes underspecified in empirical studies. We also use this study to test what the mechanisms for public and club goods provision within the two religions are—what aspects of their theology and rituals, of their community and institutional structures, promote public goods provision? We suggest that not only do organized religions provide sanctions and incentives through their theologies and institutional structures, but these same theologies and institutional structures can also elicit the pro-social tendencies of individuals.

Neither we nor most if not all of our interviewees think one must be Catholic or Muslim in order to have pro-social orientations, be generous, or otherwise provide public goods despite the personal cost to oneself. [3] The research is not intended to see if one faith is more or less generous than the other. Instead, it is focused on understanding whether and how aspects of religious faith and institutions affect pro-social behavior, and how two major organized religions provide public goods.

This paper is organized as follows: theory, method, data presentation and discussion of data, concluding comments and directions for further research.

Theory

Club Goods and Public Goods

The literature on public goods provision by civil society and its citizens is concerned with what individuals do when the state does not fulfill basic functions of the state, including security, roads, water, sewers, trash collection; and then hospitals, education. We are interested in how two organized religions, as institutions in civil society, do so in modern cities in which the state is effective (relatively speaking) at providing those kinds of public goods to its citizens.

For this study, there are two levels of goods provision in the religions: 1) within the organization, and 2) outside but run by the organization, open to all. The first is usually referred to as "club", available only to the members, the second as public, available to all. There is a third category : members of the religion being active in helping with activities and/or donating to causes not run by the religious organization. Our study, however, complicates the notion of club good, because the services are provided whether or not one, as a member, contributes to them. Within is a club good: it might be volunteering to help run some of the activities connected to religious education, after school activity centers (though those might be open to all neighborhood families, regardless of religious membership), the liturgy, other religious celebrations, funeral assistance, hospital and nursing home visitations, or home visits. External might be work with the homeless, food banks, meal programs, immigration aid, those needing other kinds of assistance.

The club goods literature would expect Catholicism and Islam, as religions with relatively easy entry and membership requirements, to under-produce club goods. This perspective leaves unanswered the question of why in such religions anyone would produce club goods, to say nothing of public goods. It's here that our research enters.

[3](Warner # 5, # 17; #42/3; #82 for specific quotes). Dublin 9, Dublin 10, Paris 5, Paris 9, Paris 10, Milan 6, Milan 10.

Religion and Collective Action

Potentially useful for explaining the relationship between religion and the provision of public goods is a long line of research assessing religion's impact on collective action.

Research on the relationship between collective action and religion has mostly focused on religion's role in producing cultural and ideological frames justifying dissent. Scholars stress the role of religious ideology and institutions in creating a mobilizing organizational capacity in the form of "social networks, shared solidarities, and leadership structures" (Trejo 2009, 323);Tarrow 1994, 11; Morris 1981; McAdam 1982; Calhoun-Brown 2000; Harris 1999; Wickham 1997; Wiktorowicz 2004). While these perspectives have all assessed religion's role in producing some form of public good, such as protest movements for to civic rights, they have not used a public goods framework to do so (McVeigh and Sikkink 2001; Dhingra and Becker 2001; Putnam 2000; Loveland, et al. 2005; Caputo 2009; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Rational approaches assessing the relationship between religion and collective action outcomes have assessed the cost/benefit calculations of religious elites. The assumption is made that once a religious elite makes the calculation to support some form of collective mobilization, the resources and ideological justifications provided by the Church provide the mobilizing framework necessary to inspire collective action. Micro-level considerations of free-riding behavior amongst the laity are not problematized (Gill 1998; Trejo 2009). Because these literatures base their answers to the collective action problem on structural political factors or group resources, they have weak microfoundations (Lichbach 1998, 347). How is it that religion overcomes the free-rider problem to facilitate the production of public goods?

Ethnicity, Public Goods, and the Search for Causal Mechanisms

The literature on the relationship between ethnicity and public goods provision (Putnam 2007; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2007) and insurgency and public goods provision (Lichbach 1998; Wood 2003; Peterson 2001; Collier 2001; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007) has advanced a sophisticated preoccupation with the testing and explication of the causal mechanisms linking variation in structural variables to variations in individual-level cost/benefit calculations (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Fearon and Laitin 1996).

In social science, this question would be addressed as one of, how or why do people cooperate (Tyler 2011)? Lily Tsai, in explaining variation in a certain form of cooperation, the informal accountability of government officials and solidary groups, finds that individuals cooperate more when "members are judged according to the group's standards of what constitutes a good person and a good member" (2007, 356). She also uses that as a criterion of what a "solidary group" is. She then states that "For moral standing to be conferred on an individual, both the individual's actions and the acceptance of shared standards have to be 'common knowledge'" (ibid). While she relies on small villages in rural China to create these conditions, we ask how our two religions create (if they do) these conditions.

The literature on ethnic conflict has several perspectives on how cooperation is attained. One is that the homogeneity of tastes (preferences) within an ethnic group facilitates cooperation, because individuals have same preferences (see summary in Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, Weinstein 2007, 710). Another view is that an individual will cooperate, bear costs of collective action, if he thinks benefits will go to in-group (ibid). A third is that there is an efficacy

mechanism: homogenous group can "draw on a reservoir of common cultural material" (Habyarimana et al 711); but leaves open question of why anyone contributes anyway.

A fourth and predominant view is that the ability of a group to enforce social sanctions is crucial to obtaining cooperation from co-ethnics, and that this ability obtains when individuals are closely connected in social networks "and thus plausibly able to better support cooperation through the threat of social sanction" (Habyarimana et al 2007, 709). This so-called findability mechanism hypothesizes that if individuals are in a tight social network, they can find and sanction non-cooperators. Habyarimana et al repeat the mantra of the public goods literature: "Adherence to a cooperative equilibrium – one in which public goods are produced – relies on expectations that cooperation will be reciprocated and shirking punished" (2007, 711). The emphasis is still on ability of the group to sanction and the individual's presumed fear of being sanctioned. The literature has also not considered who pays and bears the cost of doing the sanctioning. This body of literature would expect that the religious institutions may help overcome free-riding through institutional structures that facilitate monitoring and sanctioning.

Religion and Public Goods

However, these perspectives have not been applied to the study of religion and public goods until quite recently. A "public goods" approach to assessing the relationship between religious institutions and generosity would have to answer the question of how it is that a religious institution encourages rational individuals within a religious congregation to give to the church or to charity when they have an incentive to free-ride off charitable contributions of others. While all individuals have an incentive in seeing a public good produced, few have an incentive to pay the costs associated with producing it when they can free-ride off of the costs paid by others to produce that good.

Within this approach, an important distinction is to be made between club goods and public goods. Public goods are characterized by non- rivalry of benefits and non-excludability. This is to say that the consumption of a public good by one individual does not limit the ability of other individuals to simultaneously consume that same good (non-rivalrous), and no individuals can be excluded from consuming the good whether or not they paid the costs for its production (non-excludability) (Samuelson 1954‘ Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009).

Very few goods actually meet the criteria of public goods. Club goods are goods that are non-rivalrous in consumption but excludable. Clubs provide their members with jointly produced collective goods that are non-rivalrous but subject to overcrowding and congestion if the size of the group becomes too large. Clubs thus enact mechanisms to restrict membership and exclude others from the consumption of the good (Buchan 1965; Olson 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1996; Kaul et al. 1999; Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009). Non-participation in the production of a good can be sanctioned by withholding a club-good from non-contributors. Public goods, on the other hand, have no such possibility of exclusion. Explaining the production of a public good therefore provides a greater challenge to social scientists than does the production of a club good.

The club goods approach has subsequently become an important form of analysis in the study of religious group behavior. Religions are seen to produce non-rivalrous but excludable goods. Religious organizations use sacrifice and commitment requirements to exclude free-riders and restrict the provision of the club good to committed members (Iannaccone 1992). Religions that enact strict membership requirements are subsequently seen to be more efficient and

effective club good providers This framework has been expanded and empirically evaluated in settings as diverse as the Mormon Church (McBride 2007), terrorist activities (Iannaccone and Berman 2006) (Berman and Laitin 2008), Hurricane Katrina disaster relief (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009), mutual insurance groups in Indonesia (Chen 2010),) through experimental examination (Orman 2011), multi-national large-N statistical analysis, and computer-based simulation (Makowski 2011).

While the framework seems to accurately describe the success of strict sects in efficiently providing club goods to their members, it is less successful in explaining why mainstream institutions, with substantially lower sacrifice requirements, can also be responsible for effectively providing club goods (Makowski 2011). Religious groups, while often thought of as distributing goods to the members, also have been shown to serve out-group members as well (Cammett and Issar 2010). Why is it that these institutions seem to have a comparative advantage in providing public goods, such as charitable contributions to the poor, whose benefits are not excluded from non-contributors? Work on the relationship between religious sects and terrorist activities is particularly challenged by this point (Iannaccone and Berman 2006) (Berman and Laitin 2008). Suicide attacks, for example, can be conceptualized as a pure a public good. The positive strategic and political externalities derived from suicide terrorist attacks cannot be confined simply to terrorist or religious groups, but instead accrue to the surrounding society at large.

Pro-Social Behavior

Research in social psychology and behavioral economics is indicating that taking as the starting point strictly rational, self-interested individuals is problematic and leads to a false understanding of human behavior. Individuals are inherently pro-social, and thus sanctions and incentives are not the only or indeed always necessary factors to bring about generous, cooperative behavior in individuals (Andreoni and Rao 2011; Warneken et al 2006; Warneken and Tomasello 2008; Warneken and Tomasello 2009). Because religious teachings in Islam and Catholicism encourage the faithful to subordinate their own desires to help others (Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; cf. McBrien 1980, 977), religion should increase this effect. Thus, organized religions could have a big role in turning "on" and channeling the pro-social nature of individuals. We suggest that organized religions can provide sanctions and incentives through their theologies and structures, but that they also can elicit the pro-social tendencies of individuals through their theologies and structures.

Project Aims

We intend to test various posited causal mechanisms linking the relationship between religious communities and the provision of public goods. A large literature in political science and sociology points to the importance of institutions in affecting cooperative, other-regarding behavior (Rhodes, Binder and Rockman 2006). Variance in giving across similar individuals and groups would theoretically be a function of differing institutional arrangements (Healy 2006; Smith and Emerson 2008, 58-98; Eastis 1998; Borgonovi 2008; Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). Institutions may foster or hinder propensities towards giving to produce public goods by making it more or less difficult for individuals to know how or what to give (Healy 2000; 2006) and by increasing or decreasing the above-discussed community effects. Putnam (1993, 107-9) argues

that hierarchical organizations, specifically the Catholic Church, inhibit the development of civil society groups and "social capital" which foster the provision of public goods. In hierarchical organizations, participants are not required to interact in order to maintain the organization; they do not develop the trust, camaraderie or skills necessary to run the organization (cf. Eastis 1998; Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1996; Smith 2006). Experimental work in political science finds that decentralized organizations lead to more cooperative networks between members (Ahn, Esarey, and Scholz 2009). Thus, one would expect that the hierarchical organization of the Church would also inhibit the potential pro-social orientations of Catholics, all other things being equal. Conversely, one would expect that the non-hierarchical organization of Islam would lead to more engagement of the believers with their community and facilitate cooperative efforts.

Others argue that it is not the structure per se but that in regions where the Church has a monopoly over religion, it will act like a monopolist, ill-serving its "customers", leaving them alienated and disengaged (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Gill 1998; cf. Finke and Stark 1988; but see Borgonovi 2008) and, by extrapolation, less likely to be oriented towards generous and cooperative behavior in the organization. Comparative studies in the U.S., where the Church does not have anything approaching a monopoly on religion, found that giving by Catholics was decidedly lower than giving in some other denominations (Miller 1999; Smith and Emerson 2008, 29-30; Sweetser 1991). This suggests that we also need to consider the rituals that institutions establish around generosity and giving: how is contributing, helping others, conceptualized in relation to God, to institutional obligations, to spirituality?

While an understudied topic, a few works on wealth and religion and on religious generosity indicate that in religions, the inclination to give generously of time and money is intimately tied to the religious experience and the configuration of religious convictions. Ritual and belief are significant. Miller (1999) found that rituals about giving "reflect the theological differences between denominations," affecting people's perceptions and decisions of why and how much they give (14). How people understand their giving (directed towards God or just a membership obligation) also affects giving (1999, 14). Keister's work in the U.S. context shows that religious orientations strongly affect wealth accumulation and sacrificial giving (Keister 2003; 2007; 2008). In contrast to Catholicism, which has no formal institution of giving, particularly not as a pillar of the faith, Islam has several (Catechism 1998; Conway 1995; Queen 1996; McChesney 1995; Zayas 1960; Çizakça 2001; Özgüç 2008; Hassan 2002). Do the specific rituals of Islam facilitate the generosity of Muslims? What are the rituals of giving in Catholicism and how do they affect generosity? In addition, it is important to go beyond theological dictates to understand the institutional arrangements Catholics and Muslims have, and how those affect giving. Generosity may be affected by whether or not there are specific programs established by the parish's diocese or at the mosque or cultural center, and whether there is an organizational effort that revitalizes religious rituals to increase giving. Rituals could enhance a sense of community, heightening effects discussed above (Chwe 2001).

In addition to the institutional structure possibly having an effect on overcoming collective action dilemmas or in prompting pro-social behavior, community expectations may elicit, through incentives or sanctions, cooperative behavior. Islam and Catholicism consider integration into and cooperation with a community to be an inherently valued way of serving God. That community is expected to generate pressures to conform to group norms (Cohen et al. 2005; Cohen and Hill, 2007; Cohen and Rozin 2001; Cohen, Siegel, and Rozin 2003; Kniss and

Numrich 2007, 56-7). The ways in which each religion is organized to generate group norms, whether and how those norms affect believers' pro-social behavior, is less well known.

We go on to focus on two elements within the religious discourse (religious teachings and faith): duty to God and divine inspiration. Islam and Catholicism emphasize obedience to God's will. If God's will is that the individual be generous, then religiosity affects generosity by raising Catholic and Muslims' sense of an obligation to God. On the other hand, Catholicism has a highly organized religious hierarchy and community, whereas Islam does not, and Muslims may be particularly attuned to their direct obedience to God unmediated by a church. An alternative hypothesis, therefore, is that duty to God could have a stronger effect in generating pro-social behavior among Muslims than among Catholics.

We consider divine inspiration to be to live a life filled with love in Catholicism (Benedict XVI 2009, 1), or a life lived as the prophet Mohammed lived. A spirit of pro-sociality and thus generosity may be born from a sense of duty or "adherence to God's plan" that brings freedom to give abundantly. Religion may engender generosity through spirituality and a sense of grace, a commitment to and faith in God, God working "through, with, and in us" (Himes 2006, 18, 19; Benedict XVI 2009; Kozlowski 1998, 282; Queen 1996, 27, 50). Catholicism specifically expects "faith, hope and charity" to be the expression of God dwelling within the person (McBrien 1980, 991). In Islam, giving stems from being a "righteous man" or woman. It is "for the love of Allah" that one gives to others (Qur'an, Sura 2:177). One would expect Catholics and Muslims with strong religiosity to be more generous than those with lower levels.

We set aside for now a consideration of how the state structure context, that is, the social welfare, tax and religious regulatory structure. Some research has shown that there is a "crowding out" effect on generosity from state-supplied social welfare, with the logic being that if the state provides the social net, there is no need for individuals or religious organizations to do so (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004; Hungerman 2005; cf. CAF 2006). Other studies have found its effects to be complementary or inconclusive (Dahlberg 2005; Scheepers and Te Grotenhuis 2005, 461). The effects in Catholicism and Islam have not been studied, but one would expect that these effects could obtain but be muted in religious individuals by the dynamics noted above. Regarding state subsidies to religion, if the state subsidizes an organized religion, the religion's upkeep costs may be reduced, relieving followers of the "need" to give for that purpose. Our data are unable to test these hypotheses though we are able to introduce some intriguing indications that the crowding out hypothesis is indeed muted by religion. In all four countries, we found that state subsidies to the organized religions were almost non-existent, thus we are unable to test for the effect of that factor on public good provision by religions.

***Methodology*:**

Empirical locus of research.We selected one city in each country, Dublin, Milan, Paris, and Istanbul, studying a Catholic Church and Muslim organization in each. These four cities enable us to study generosity dynamics of Catholicism when in majority and minority status, and of Islam when in minority and majority status. The cities were chosen on the basis of presence of Turkish Muslim populations, and Catholic minority populations.

Islam has a wider variety of practices and orientations, some of which vary by ethnicity or nationality, than does Catholicism. We hold the national origin and religious orientation

constant in Islam by focusing upon the cultural centers established by the Turkish Gülen movement in our four countries (Flynn 2006, 232; Lacey 2009, 301). While this means the target population is small in Ireland and Italy (Lacey 2009; Pirotta 2008), that will enable us to assess our hypothesis that small, isolated groups are more likely to take care of their own than larger, established groups. Indeed, we have a similar comparison available between Catholicism in Turkey (very small, isolated group) and Catholicism in the other countries. We recognize that it is not possible to identify an Islamic movement that all Muslims and scholars would agree is representative and typical of Islam. However, Islam's basic message of charity is constant across the religion, and the Gülen Movement has several advantages for our study: it is a relatively mainstream transnational organization within Islam, it is relatively transparent and open about its activities, it is present in our four countries, and especially prominent in Turkey (Yavuz 2003, 133-206; Kilinc 2007; Kuru 2003; Kuru 2005). To accommodate the fact that in some Muslim dominant countries, mosques are used only for prayer and are state run (Turkey) or state supported, our study of Muslims will focus on a Gülen organization rather than on a mosque in each city. It is the cultural centers that are the locus of religious mobilization and community, so they are the functional equivalent of parish churches for studying generosity dynamics of the faithful (Lacey 2009; cf. Cesari 1994; Abdoun et al. 2004; Allievi 2003; Manço 1997, 100; FASLID 2006; Landman and Wessels 2005; Maréchal 2003; McLoughlin 2005; Negri and Introvigne 2005; Klausen 2005). Choosing large urban centers in four European countries, and organizations in Islam and in Catholicism that are, respectively, similar, facilitates unit homogeneity, which in turn facilitates the internal validity of the study and improves our ability to make causal inferences (Goertz 2006, 177-210).

Case Studies.

The case studies are geared towards identifying the causes of effects by focusing on the pathway or mechanism between the purported cause and its effect (Brady 2008; Brady, Collier and Seawright 2006). We mostly focused on a Catholic parish, and an Islamic cultural center within each city. We also assess the organization of the religion in the city and country. We used semi-structured interviews of approximately 25 individuals in each religious organization (parish or mosque). We attempted to recruit both those who attend regularly, as they would be most exposed to religious messages, and those who are on the "membership" rolls but do not attend regularly. The interviews include questions structured to match the five experimental treatments, as well as ask about concepts not directly tested in the experiments, including divine inspiration, ritual and state context. They included "grand tour" questions such as "tell me about a typical religious service"; "how do the religious services affect you?"; and "tell me what giving means to you"; as well as more specific questions such as "is it correct to say that God requires you to give of your time and money?"; "what happens if you don't give?"; "who or what should be the beneficiary of your church/mosque's charitable activities?"; "is it the state's responsibility to care for the poor?"; and "if you engage in volunteer activities, what are they and what do they mean to you?" Participants were asked to fill out a survey asking demographic information and assessing intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.

The site specific studies also include research into the organizations of each religion and the networks in which they are embedded in order to see if there are manifestations of the hypothesized structural mechanisms. Interviews with leaders of each religious organization

(priest, bishop, imam, mosque committee head) show how they think and reason about generosity and enable us to document the broader context and considerations of the giving and voluntarism in the religious organizations. We gathered information on funding structures, as well as social and charitable programs, and talked to all interviewees about their participation in these. We engaged in participant observations of weekly religious services and charitable activities.

Our parishioner interviews were structured to get at individual motivations for particular behaviors. We recognize that what our interviewees tell us may not be what is actually motivating them when they engage in a behavior, or, in slightly different language, causing them to engage in a behavior.[4] Nevertheless, the interviews are critical for knowing how Muslims and Catholics understand their religions and at least what they think is going on when they engage in the behaviors we are interested in. We posit that if we observe systematic differences between Muslims and Catholics in what they say about their beliefs and behaviors, and that these are relatively consistent within each religious group, then the religions have channeled the behavior of their faithful in particular ways. The interviews with parishioners are also critical for getting data on community expectations, community and religious structure. The interviews are not our sole source of data. They are supplemented with information gathering interviews with religious leaders, and with documentation on the religions and their charitable organizations, and with experimental data (not all yet analyzed so not presented here).

The field research was conducted in various months from May 2010 to May 2011, with one researcher spending approximately four weeks with a religious group. Experiments were conducted in Istanbul and Dublin between October and November, 2010, and additional experiments were conducted in both cities in July, 2011.[5] The timing of grant funding coincided with a recession that affected the countries we did research in, including an unprecedented IMF-EU bailout situation in Ireland. The attendant financial stress may have affected how much our interviewees were able to give financially, but the focus of our research was on understanding how these two organized religions create public goods, not on how much the parishes and Gulen associations gave or raised funds. .[6]

Data and analysis:

The Catholic parishes and Islamic associations:

We first present a brief portrait of each of the religious communities. The discussion then examines the impact of both Catholic and Islamic institutional repertoires on the provision of public goods. The discussion then examines the spiritual repertories of Catholicism and Islam

[4] See the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion Presidential Address by Mark Chaves, and a later, contrasting, plea for taking seriously what people say about their religious experiences (Chaves 2010; Wuthnow 2011).

[5] Kilinc conducted the research on the Gulen movement associations in Istanbul, Paris, Milan and Dublin, and on the Catholic parish in Istanbul; Warner conducted the research on the Catholic parishes in Paris, Milan and Dublin, and Cohen conducted experiments on university students and community members in Istanbul and Dublin.

[6] Donations to the parish of St. Pierre de Montrouge in France increased by a slight amount on a per capita basis between 2008 and 2009, despite there being fewer donors and France also experiencing a recession. Accounts for 2010 not available at time of writing. Comptes 2009 de la Paroisse de St Pierre de Montrouge. Mss, Père Philippe Marsset and Yves Jouen.

that contribute to the provision of public goods, including rituals of giving, a perceived "duty to God." The discussion concludes by examining the impact of the religious community on the provision of public goods.

CATHOLIC PARISHES

Santa Maria alla Fontana, Milan, Italy.
This is the parish in which Silvio Berlusconi was baptized (he was not a billionaire at the time). The neighborhood, hemmed in by the Zara, Isola and Corso Como areas outside the tourist zones of Milan, is modest, comfortable, and has a lot of immigrants. The parish has 14,000 parishioners, 2000 attend mass weekly. It has four priests, including one who is retired but who helps with functions. The volunteer groups include: Saint Vincent de Paul (SVdP, San Vincento di Paolo), l'Oasi (retired peoples' group), the Oratorio (youth center), the Pastoral Council, catechism school. Others volunteer (and there is overlap between groups) in the parish office, and with the liturgy, and with various celebrations that take place at the church (annual saint day, Christmas sale, etc). In the parish but not run by it is a Food Bank, staffed by many volunteers who attend the church. The church is largely sustained by funds collecting during offerings and by pledges. For some restoration work (the basic work), the church has gotten funds from the Italian state, due to the church's status as an historic site. The church also has special collections during the major religious holidays (particularly Christmas and Easter) that go to particular causes, such as the poor in the parish, or for a school run by missionaries in Africa. Parishioners are notified in various ways of funding requests and needs: mostly the monthly bulletin that can be picked up at the church, and the posting of the monthly budget revenues and expenses on a bulletin board at the main entrance to the church.

St Pierre de Montrouge, Paris, France.
Located in the non-touristy 14th arrondissment, it has about twelve paid staff, 5-600 volunteers just to run church office and main organizations. 50,000 parishioners, about 4,000 attend mass weekly (with about 2100 coming on weekends, excluding the major holidays). The parish is largely middle-class, upper middle-class, with an immigrant community as well. It has six priests and one deacon. There are lots of volunteer groups, many very active. As in Santa Maria alla Fontana, many parishioners volunteer with other Catholic charities in the parish, that are not run by the parish (Secours Catholique, Saint Vincent de Paul or SVdP, Comité Catholique contre le Faim et pour le Développment or CCFD). They are given some support by the parish, depending on the preferences of the priest and advice of the parish Economic Council. Some 80% of its expenses have to be met by tithing and other collections.[7]

Our Mother of Divine Grace Ballygall parish, Dublin Ireland.
Ballygall is outside the city center, within Dublin (Dublin 11), in a hilly middleclass neighborhood. It has about 6,200 parishioners (90% Catholic), about 25% (1,300) of the Catholics attend mass weekly. In contrast to Milan, Paris and Istanbul, parishes in Dublin are known by the name of the parish, not by the name of the local parish church. Two priests, a sister, one sacristan. Parish secretary (paid). Lots of volunteers in a variety of organizations, and

[7] CITE Curé letter & interview # 55 (Economic Council head).

the laity is quite involved in religious services (the liturgy, the children's mass), in baptism teams, in funeral team. They are beginning to get trained to do healing services in response to the paucity of priests. As are all parishes in the Dublin diocese, Ballygall is being clustered with four others, with the aim of sharing resources. Again, this is due largely to the dearth of priests. The parishes have had concerns about getting volunteers for activities, and there are worries about whether the next generations will be as engaged. The Ballygall parish was not one in which any of the child abuse/pedophile cases were in, but many of the interviewees and the priest voluntarily brought up the scandal and discussed how hard it has been on the victims, on them, and how it has led many Catholics to quit coming to mass. The Moderator of the Curia also brought it up.[8] The interviewees who broached the subject always distinguished between their faith and the local parish church, toward which they retained favorable attitudes, and what they described (accurately) as the failings of the institutional Church.[9]

Basilique Cathedrale Saint Esprit, Istanbul, Turkey. There are about 2000 Catholics living in Istanbul. The Basilique Cathedrale Saint Esprit has about 200-250 congregants. The church has three priests. We were told that a fourth priest had just retired before we arrived. The Head Vicar also resides in this Church as this is the center of the Vicarate. The church attendees are from three different groups of people: Levantines (the French and Italian immigrants inherited from the Ottoman Empire),); the immigrant community from the Philippines, most of whom are babysitters; and immigrants from African countries, especially from Congo. The church also receives many Catholic tourists because (1) it is a very historical church, and (2) it provides religious services to the tourists as well. In the summers, there is a service everyday at 6:00 p.m. in the church. The immigrants, some of which are illegal, live under difficult conditions. Most of the personal charities go to these immigrants' needs.

GULEN COMMUNITY

IHSANDER, Istanbul, Turkey. There are many associations in Istanbul established by the Gulen community. Even though IHSANDER looks like a businessmen association, it serves religious services to its followers informally. It also organizes several charitable activities. It is not established as a religious organization; because, organizing around religion is legally not allowed in Turkey. The association has about 350 active members; however, it offers religious and charitable services to thousands of people. When the interviews were conducted, the most pressing agenda was construction of a dormitory that would house more than one thousand high school students. The members were trying to gather donations from the people around them to facilitate the construction.

Yunus Emre Cultural Association, Paris, France. The Turkish population in France is about 600,000. Almost three quarters of them live in Paris. Gulen community has 6 associations in

[8] We have some data derived from the experiments that may enable us to gage the impact of the scandal on Irish Catholics' generosity and on their attitudes towards their faith and the Church. We have not had time to code and analyze all that data yet.

[9] CITES to Martin report, Cloyne report, and Enda Kenny's parliamentary speech.

Paris. The Yunus Emre Cultural Association offers religious and cultural services to its members. It serves about 500-600 people. Some of the activities that the association organizes are: weekly religious education courses, weekend school for the Turkish schoolchildren in which they are taught about Islam and Turkish culture. The association also organizes charitable activities to help people around the world. When we were there, they organized a program in which they collected help for Pakistani flood victims. The organization is also affiliated with a private Turkish school. Finally, it organizes interfaith and intercultural activities to inform the French people about Islam and Turkish community. Our interviews were just before the Eid al-Adha, a major Muslim festival, in which poor are provided with meat. The community was busy with gathering money to get meat for the Pakistani flood victims.

Alba Intercultural Association, Milan, Italy. The Turkish community in Italy is very small (not more than 15,000). There are about 4,000 Turks living in Milan, Italy. There is only one Gulen community association in Milan, Alba Intercultural Association. There are about 200 people who are somehow affiliated with the association. As in Paris, the association offers weekly religious education lectures, weekend school for the Turkish immigrant schoolchildren, and intercultural/interfaith activities. As compared to Paris, the association in Milan focuses more on intercultural activities. The main target of the association is the Italian people. In doing so, they aim to inform them about Islam and Turkish culture. Unlike other cities, weekly Friday prayers are performed in the association. Like Paris, our interviews were just before the Eid al-Adha, a major Muslim festival, in which poor are provided with meat. The community was busy with gathering support for the Pakistani flood victims.

Turkish-Irish Educational and Cultural Society, Dublin, Ireland. The Turkish immigrant community in Ireland is the smallest among all the four cities. An officer from the the Turkish embassy said that there is about 5,000 Turks living in Ireland, most of which live in Dublin. (CITE). Gulen community has only one association in Dublin, TIECS (Turkish-Irish Educational and Cultural Society). The association is the smallest of all. There are about 100-125 people somehow affiliated with the association. They have unorganized weekend classes for the Turkish schoolchildren. Like Italy, their major concentration is interfaith/intercultural dialogue. The major concentration during my stay in Dublin was rental of a bigger place for the association, preferably in the city center. The Gulen community in Ireland also had campaigns for Pakistani flood victims during the Eid al-Adha festival. right before we conducted our interviews.

Institutions:

Catholic Institutions

The issues connecting Catholicism to public goods provision could be framed in the following ways: How does a hierarchical organization with low barriers to entry for members, a loose authority structure, and few material incentives and sanctions create club or public goods? When its main claim over individuals is through credence goods, how does it function?

The Catholic Church is a hierarchical organization. The religious functions provided at the parish level run by a priest or set of priests who serve at the will of the bishop of the diocese, who, in turn and in most cases, serves at will of Bishop of Rome (the Pope). Priests can be and routinely are moved to a different parish, within a bishop's diocese (rotated every 6-9 years).

Priests and Bishops can be disciplined by their superiors. Parishes and the diocese they are within have geographic boundaries. The point of the parish is to "give birth to new Christians" and sustain the Christian (Catholic) community.[10] Those baptized into the Catholic faith and residing within a particular parish are considered members of that parish. There is an expectation that they will attend (if they attend) services at the church in that parish.

However, the church hierarchy has less control over clergy than meets the eye, particularly when comes to directing charitable activity or altering doctrine to give it a particular emphasis (or to put out a call to support a charity or mobilize Catholics). Priests have leeway in their own parishes whether or not to initiate projects that the Bishop or Archbishop might advocate. As the Dublin Moderator of the Curia stated, he had more freedom as a priest in a parish to do what he wanted than he does working directly for the Archbishop of the diocese.

The head priest in a parish has the authority to decide policy (within the bounds of the Catholic Church) within his parish. In keeping with the reforms of Vatican II, parishes have Pastorale Councils of parishioners usually elected to a 3-5 year term. Many also have Economic Councils. Both such councils are advisory to the head priest. While this gives priests considerable authority, they (and rest of hierarchy) are in no position to sanction Catholics for not giving to the offering, or for not volunteering. Further, if they venture too far afield of their parishioners' preferences, they risk losing the volunteers who are crucial to the functions of the parish church. Priests can only give a slight incentive to the extent it matters to individuals by personally acknowledging giving if they know about it, sending out reminder letters (for annual pledges), or by getting to know people as they volunteer in activities. This is not the kind of sanctioning the public goods thinks of. Not giving is not a mortal sin, and is not subject to ex-communication.[11] Furthermore, giving is private: pledges and the keeping of pledges for donations are not made public; at best one might see a small memorial plaque on a pew, donated by a loved one, but the name of the donor is not evident (as seen in Ballygall). Those who know how much someone has donated are those who fulfill the bookkeeping offices of the parish church; in small parishes that might be a volunteer but that structure does not give rise to peer pressure or social exclusion if one does not follow through on a pledge, or gives less than what might be thought to be appropriate. And much of the offering comes in the form of cash in the weekly services, so not traceable to individuals. In addition, priests cannot bar a Catholic residing in one parish from attending the services of another. Indeed, they have no incentive to: it would just create resentment. The church-shopping that American Protestants engage in is not a common practice amongst European Catholics.

Those who benefit from the sacraments of the church are not required to donate funds or give of their time in exchange. For instance, there may be fees for the marriage ceremony, but not the expectation of additional gifts that, if not forthcoming, invalidate the marriage. Catholics are not excluded from sacraments if they do not donate funds or give time or otherwise provide benefits to the church community or community at large. This includes: baptism, first Eucharist (first communion), confirmation, marriage, confession, anointing of the sick, funeral mass. Entry

[10] Msg. Lorcan O'Brien, Moderator of the Curia, Dublin Archdiocese, Dublin Nov. 23, 2010.

[11] Over the centuries, the Catholic Church has established numerous mechanisms to get contributions from the faithful; the institution of purgatory and the required purchasing of indulgences to get out of it famously come to mind . In the parishes we studied, receiving the host, participating in mass, was not contingent upon having contributed to the church offering or Catholic charities or on having volunteered time in the church or in charities.

to the church or any of its most holy sites is not contingent upon being a provider of public goods/club goods. (The Irish noted that the drawback to the first communion is the expense of the clothes, the gifts to/from relatives, the large family gathering party that the family of the child is expected to host).

The one evident exclusionary practice, such as it is, is that users of the volunteer services of Saint Vincent de Paul, at the parish level, are referred to the parish that they reside in, rather than the parish from which they may have initially sought help. SVdP screens aggressively on that, to discourage abuse of assistance, duplication of assistance, and to avoid enabling the requester from failing to address the sources of his or her problem by merely going to a new parish center after having exhausted the resources and goodwill of a previous one. SVdP is, however, not run by the parishes. So priests and the Catholic Church have no control over how it organizes its activities. A parish may (most do) offer space and other resources (the utilities) to a parish-level SVdP, and announce that there is a collection for SVdP (in Dublin, this was once a month, with the SVdP volunteers standing outside the church doors at the end of services), and most of those who volunteer with SVdP in a parish also attend that parish's church.

The Church and the local churches are non-exclusionary. Users of "charity" services, such as the help centers that are staffed by Saint Vincent de Paul volunteers, are not required to be Catholic. They are not asked what their faith is; only, as noted above, they are, in the case of SVdP, asked if they live in the parish where they are seeking assistance. The head priest in Istanbul also emphasized the non-excludability of the receivers of charity: "Although most of those who come for help are Christians, especially immigrant Christians, we do not discriminate against Muslims as well" (Istanbul Catholic 2). However, we were also told that the Church tried to avoid helping Muslims so as not to be attacked for "doing missionary work by giving food to poor and needy Muslims" (Istanbul Catholic 2). Christians appearing to proselytize in Muslim Turkey does not sit well with authorities or the general public. While social science theories of collective action expect that being open to all, not just the in-group, would reduce incentives for volunteers to donate of their time and energy, volunteers regarded it as a normal part of being human and being Catholic—one helps those in need, regardless of their origin or faith. If anything, the openness to all seemed to energize the volunteers. Given that they had already volunteered, we cannot know if some who didn't volunteer were dissuaded by the knowledge they would not just be helping their own.

Also affecting the impact of the institution, while formally Catholicism is more hierarchical than Islam, because of the paucity of priests, and because of the expansion of activities local churches engage in, the laity are given many opportunities to take responsibility for the functions of the church. Thus, Catholics are very engaged in the life of the church in the parish—if they weren't, and just attended mass, the church couldn't function—could not even deliver the mass. Parishioners (trained to be on a Eucharist team) even supplement the priests during mass to deliver the Host (wafer) to congregants. They have more opportunities to be in contexts of providing public goods to the church. As the literature on "asking" indicates, having the opportunity to give is a critical part of eliciting generous behavior. In tandem, so too is the fact of being asked. Many Catholic interviewees said they were asked to join a group. They had had a predisposition, but were drawn in by having been asked: by the priest, by a nun, by a friend. As one Italian woman in her late 50s stated, "I didn't' know how to say 'no'; now I'm learning how to say 'no'" (# 12). An Irish man in his 30s noted he was asked to be a communion

minister, and asked to volunteer for the parish SVdP group. He added that he thinks everyone should help (# 30). The "should" is not tied to dictates from Catholicism or Biblical teachings; it is more a sense of helping the community. An Irish woman active in various church service functions noted that "being asked opens the door" (# 28).

Islamic institutions:

Islam is a decentralized, non-hierarchical religion with multiple schools of law and of social requirements.[12] Islamic religious leaders have no enforcement mechanisms to obtain obedience from their adherents; there are no sacraments in Islam which can be withheld from Muslims in order to obtain compliance with the wishes of imams or other 'clerics' regarding charitable or other cooperative activities that they may want the faithful to contribute to. The lack of hierarchy has a couple consequences for the giving of the Muslims.

On the one hand, the lack of hierarchy in Islam leads Muslims to engage more in community affairs since the maintenance of religious and community services depend on the engagement of the community itself. This makes the religious communities more responsible and engaged in the community affairs. This engagement in the administration of the community leads members to give more time and material resources in all four Gulen communities. In explaining their motivations to support local associations, some respondents pointed out very broad responsibilities while others pointed out day-to-day needs of their immediate communities (especially those who live as immigrants in Paris, Milan and Dublin). Two quotations illustrate the views of the first group of people very well. A man in his 30s from Paris (#7) noted, "It is our responsibility to make our religion progress in France." Similarly, a businessman (in his 40s) from Istanbul (# 21) made his feelings of responsibility very clear: "The Muslim world now is backward due to the sluggishness of our ancestors. We should not leave a room for our grandsons and granddaughters to complain about us."

Muslim respondents, especially immigrants, also noted the immediate problems of their community as a motivation for their giving. One theme that most respondents noted was the problems related to the image of Muslims in Western Europe. A respondent from Paris (# 1) noted, "we need strong intercultural organizations to change the Muslim image in France." Other respondents also noted this issue (e.g. Milan 5, Milan 29, Dublin 11) and justified their contributions by their efforts to elevate the status of Turkish Muslim community in their respective cities. Another group of people especially emphasized the proper education (which also includes religious education) of their kids (e.g. Paris 6, 11, 28). The words of a woman from Paris (# 11) in her 50s are illustrative: "When I was raising my kids, we did not have these associations in Paris. I tried my best to raise my kids in a Muslim way but I could do it to a very limited extent. I was unlucky. I do want my kids be lucky in raising their kids by having this kind of facilities (meaning the cultural association)".

On the other hand, the lack of hierarchy requires a strong mobilization and organization of the community at the local level. Thus, even though there is not a hierarchy within the Gulen community organizations as it is in the Catholic communities, the Gulen communities are very well organized in their local settings. Within each association, the followers meet weekly in smaller groups of 8-12 people. In the weekly meetings, participants first have religious

[12] The exception is minor for its effects in Europe: one relatively small branch of Islam, the Shi'a, adherents of which are scarce in Europe, is centralized and hierarchical

discussions by reading from Quran or Prophet Mohammed's sayings. Then they discuss the pressing day-to-day issues of the association. These weekly meetings are where important decisions about the community are taken. Depending on their availability, each participant in the group takes responsibilities to be completed within the week ahead. This is the forum which strengthens the bonds between the community and individual members. Most of the respondents in all cities mentioned the importance of weekly meetings both for their religiosity and their attachment with the community. For example, a respondent from Paris (# 7) said "we gather at least once weekly. Sometimes this number may increase depending on the agenda. I see these meetings as an opportunity to deepen my own religiosity and to serve the larger community."

Rituals of giving within the Institutions
Catholicism:

In the French, Italian Irish and Turkish Catholic services, monetary giving was downplayed. There were collections at each service, but they were not incorporated into the other parts of the service; the priest did not link giving or the collection with any spiritual or other ends. At most, the priest stated that the collection or collections were for one or another item.[13] The collection follows the liturgy readings and the (short) sermon.[14] For most (if not all) interviewees, there was nothing specific about the mass or a priest's sermons that they could recall prompting or inspiring them to be generous or other-regarding; as one noted, "all is linked" in the religious service (# 17, Italian male in 40s). To the extent the interviewees reflected on the teachings of their faith, most noted, in the words of one, everything in the faith propels one towards "consideration of others" (# 17, Italian male in 40s). An Irish parishioner noted that "certainly there are sermons that talk about Gospel stories which have examples of giving" (# 28). Irish parishioners noted that "they never really ask [for money]; they never say "we want your money"" (# 30); it's more that parishioners hear "if you could, please give"—a fine point, but to the parishioners' minds, it makes a difference. Many interviewees noted they give as they can, and don't discriminate between causes or programs/beneficiaries (CITES). Another Irish parishioner stated that the priest "never does ask for funds, he never ever does" (# 28). In that same parish, a retired man noted, laughing, "they're always lookin' for money for something, they're a basic source of charity in Ireland… they've always looked after the poor" and "there are always boxes rattlin' in front of you" but indicated that requests were *not* made explicit during services. He added that the priest might mention that there is a collection for one or another charitable organization going on outside the church after mass but that the priest doesn't push it (#82). In France at St. Pierre de Montrouge, one finds a small brochure on a table near the main door, with the bulletins, that is labeled "the collection: why? for whom? how much?". After answering the first two questions, it suggests what might be an appropriate contribution during the mass. That suggestion part is on the very back of the brochure—it's the last thing one looks

[13] In Istanbul,we were told that all the collections after the services were for the expenses of the priests and the church. Since the church has a small number of congregants, it needs more help for its own functioning as compared to other cities. However, we were told that the internal financing was enough for operating costs of the church.
[14] At Ballygall, just after the sermon at the children's mass (attended by quite a few parents and grandparents), the priest announces how much was collected the last week, and what the different colored collection bags are for. Then someone reads the Nicene creed, then there is another prayer reading, then the passing of one bag, then another. # 75, 5/8/2011. Slightly different order at adult masses (prayer after passing of bags).

at, so, again, discrete. The head of the Economic council said that they developed this in response to lasting confusion from the currency conversion from the French franc to the euro—people were no longer sure what was a reasonable amount. The brochure discretely suggests two euro for the head of the family, and to add another euro for each additional member of the family who participates at mass. It concludes by saying that "your participation is a sign of your confidence in the life of the body of Christ"—it does not even repeat the word "donation" or "gift"—it instead steers the notion of funds towards "participation." The head of the Economic Council noted that in the year since they produced that brochure, contributions went up (despite the recession) from an average of 1.5 euros/person to 1.84 euros/person (#55). In Istanbul, two children from the parish collected money for the church after each service. The head priest stated that in addition to weekly collections, the church organizes four major fundraising events throughout the year: One of them, for the church, is in April, one for Vatican in December, one for missionaries around the world in October on the World Mission Sunday, and one for CARITAS during the Lent period (congregants are given an envelope to return it back with their contributions).

At services in Dublin, Paris, Milan and Istanbul, the need for volunteers was not mentioned. Recruitment tended to happen by word of mouth and by the priest or other official asking individuals if they would consider taking on a role.

There are other spiritual "goods" that raise funds for church functions: the candles (# 55), donations to religious orders who then prayer for you (# 79). Commenting on an order of nuns she sends donations to, an Irish parishioner explained, "We have nuns down there who are praying for us. You can write to them and give them your requests, they're coming from good women. Hopefully He's listening [then she gave a gentle laugh]." (#79).

Islam

The most significant ritual of giving in Islam is zakat, which is compulsory for all Muslims who have sufficient material resources. As one interviewee in Paris also reminded, zakat was mentioned in Quran several times right after daily prayers, which is considered as the most significant Islamic ritual, were mentioned (Paris 24).[15] The ritual of fitr, a charity given to the poor at the end of the fasting in the holy month of Ramadan, is another obligatory giving for all every Muslim, whether male or female, minor or adult as long as he/she has the means to do so. The head of the household pay the required amount for the other members. Sadaqa is another form of charity which is optional and can be given anytime at any amount.

For those who are less engaged with the associations, the religious rituals of giving (zakat, fitr, etc…) encourage them to give more. As a Turkish Muslim in Dublin stated, "The best criteria of giving is determined by Islam through the zakat. That's my aim to give my zakat annually. If I reach that goal, I feel myself very happy" (Dublin 30). However, many interviewees (especially those who are more engaged within the associations) did not even mention these rituals in their interviews. When asked why they did not refer to these religious values, they responded that those were required for all and giving in the amount of zakat was just a duty. To them, real giving is giving beyond the required amount of zakat (this can still be evaluated under another religious concept, sadaqa, which is not limited by any amount. You can give sadaqa as much as you wish). However, it may be misleading to argue that zakat and other

[15] Some references in the Quran include: 2/43; 2/83; 2/177; 4/77; 5/55; 9/71; 21/73; 22/78; 98/5.

values are less significant in Muslims' giving just because the interviewees did not mention these values. It seems that most interviewees internalized these values and did not consider it part of their giving. As one Gulen member in Istanbul stated (Istanbul 11), "After we got to know "hizmet", we stopped calculating our zakat amount.[16] What we give to the association is much higher than what we are required to give as a zakat requirement." This demonstrates that these rituals put the minimum limits of giving for devoted Muslims, and a target for less devoted but still religious Muslims. For a Gulen member in Paris, when asked if the institution of zakat or fitr motivates him to give more, here was the response Iwe got: "What! Zakat and fitr are of course important. They are part of our religion and we have all respect to them. And we fulfill our responsibilities of zakat and fitr. But how can we do all the activities that we need to do by only relying on zakat and fitr. We have to give more to serve the humanity better" (Paris 18).

Giving and charity are not addressed directly in religious sermons. However, especially in Istanbul, Paris, and Milan, references to giving were made due to the agenda of the associations. When Kilinc was in Istanbul, the members were trying to find outside funding (from the people around them) for their dormitory project. In Paris and Milan, the Festival of Eid al-Adha was approaching, so people were busy to get food support for Pakistani flood victims. These issues were raised from time to time during sermons and religious lectures. Giving is not performed in weekly sermons. However, a donation box is available at the associations and those who would like to contribute put some money to this box. However, each association has annual events to collect charitable contributions; donation boxes are just subsidiary. Below are the annual events:

1) Each year, generally in the month of Ramadan, they have their annual fundraising event. ("himmet" in Turkish). Members' contributions are comprised of two subcategories: (a) the amount that they pledge to give throughout the upcoming year; and (b) the amount that they pledge to find from others (mostly sympathizers but not active members). We were told that sometimes there may be two separate events for each subcategory (Istanbul 18). In this event, people make their annual pledge in front of all the attendees in the room. The meeting is not open to public, only a select group of devoted people are invited into this meeting. Most of the time, their engagement and religious devotion are criteria to invite them to the meeting. The money coming from the annual fundraising event is generally used in associations' own educational, social, and religious activities. Most of the time, contributors consider their zakat obligations in their pledges as well. (Istanbul # 16, 24, 25, 30; Paris # 13, 24, 26, 30; Milan # 1, 2, 6, 9, 13, 32; Dublin # 18, 20, 25)
2) Each year, before the Festival of Eid al-Adha, each association organizes a campaign to collect food support for the people in different places. Each city is given a place. This year, all the cities collected help for Pakistani flood victims. In Islam, people are required to slaughter a lamb in this festival. The associations collect the money for these lambs and distribute the meat in poor and needy areas of the world. The movement's local people (let say in Kenya) organize the distribution and charities in this regard. (several references from the interviews in Paris and Milan).

[16] *Hizmet* is the Turkish shorthand for the movement. It means "service"

3) Special Fundraising Events: If something comes up (either about association's local activities or a disaster in some parts of the world), special events are organized. For example, the members of all four city associations told that they had organized events for victims of Haiti earthquake and Pakistani flood. (several references from all cities).

In addition to these, there are a number of other ad hoc ways of giving in the community. One is the increasing generosity of the members especially for the poor and needy in the holy month of Ramadan. In this month, Muslims are required to fast from sunrise to sunset and make obligatory charity to the poor (fitr, see above). In addition to obligatory charity, people also become more generous in their voluntary charities (sadaqa). This is the month when the movement's charity organization (Kimse Yok Mu?) collects financial contributions the most.[17] Another way of giving, which is called "kermes" in Turkish, was employed by those women who do not work outside the home. Most of the women that we interviewed in Paris and Milan were unemployed but they were still contributing by making hand-crafted articles together and selling them in special occasions. Related to this, the women also come together to cook and sell them to raise money for particular projects of the association (Paris 8, Paris 10, Milan 2, Milan 11, Milan 29). These kinds of organizations especially increase when the association organizes campaign for those in need after the disasters (e.g. Haiti and Pakistani earthquakes).
We address next the role of "duty to God" in motivating or being what Catholics or Muslims understand to be the reason they give funds, give of time, help others.

Duty to God

Catholicism is a religion that has to rely extensively on the faith, or upbringing or other life situations, to give Catholics a disposition to be generous, rather than mostly on a set of incentives and sanctions based on material factors. All the priests interviewed spoke of an emphasis on faith and on having parishioners understand their faith as being the means of promoting generosity. Yet most Irish parishioners spoke of their family background and upbringing, or schooling (granted, it was in Catholic run-schools—older Irish generations remembered being told they had to help "babies in Africa" even if, as schoolchildren, they didn't know why) as being the source of their generous dispositions, their sense that they wanted to help others in need. While noting her parents were very devout Catholics, an older Irishwoman notes: "I was brought up in a very caring and giving family … some families give and some don't. A huge amount of it goes down to my mom and dad, and my aunts and uncles" (# 79)." A French interviewee, a devout Catholic raised in the Church and who frequently attended mass and led some volunteer groups in the parish, credited his participation in Boy Scouts as giving him his sense of wanting to help others (# 55).

For Catholics, the faith does not, contrary to what we had initially hypothesized, rely on a sense of duty or obligation to God. As a male Italian interviewee in his 30s stated (# 13), "Jesus didn't say 'you have to do this.' Jesus said 'this is the path, you choose.'" An Irish parishioner echoes this view: "God gives me a choice. God prompts me and he allows me to say yes or no and I know if I say yes he's going to be there with me all the time. There's nothing he won't help me with" (not that God threatens to withdraw support if she says "no") (#79). The religion relies on love, on love of Jesus, on love of the other. It needs to be stated that priests and many

[17] Interview with a high-level official from Kimse Yok Mu organization. Name and date will be provided later.

interviewees see this love as a source of charity towards others, but that they indicate (expressly or implicitly) that is not the point or goal of such love. The love is an end in itself, that also and inevitably leads to generous behavior by believers. One interviewee (#11) cited the Gospel (Matthew 25:40), "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." An Irish parishioner stressed that helping and giving is "not a duty, there have been opportunities. I was drifting a bit, the door opened" (# 28). Another responded, "you're not morally bound, I suppose, to give… It's part of Catholic teaching to be charitable, part of your religion and belief that you must help the deprived." He used the phrase "must help" but he rejected the idea that helping others was a duty or obligation to God (# 82). It was a general "you should" and not one mandated by God. Because Jesus' and God's love does not have to be earned, earning it through giving to others (or to God via donations to the church) is irrelevant. It doesn't make sense in the religion. A parishioner from Istanbul (# 13) said "God loves those who followed what Jesus did [by meaning helping those in need]" but she did not put this as a requirement to gain God's approval. An Irish parishioner explains that she gives to the family offering in Ballygal (making and fulfilling a pledge of financial support). She says "it's voluntary, you don't have to give. I feel very obliged to support my church" (#79).[18] When asked if this comes from the religion's teachings, she responded "Everything has to be funded no matter what it is, whether you feel you have to or you want to give it. Practically, the priests have to live, the church has to be funded. It's a practicality to me. I want to give it. I can see the money that we give is put back into the church. I can see it. It's not as if the church's gotten all dilapidated" and the money's disappeared (# 79). She mentioned being able to see that the church had put in a new roof to replace the old leaky one. Parishioners who linked their giving with specific scriptures often noted, as one flatly stated, "there are only two commandments that matter: love God and love your neighbor" (# 80-1). From those, all generosity, and hence public good provision, flows.

While our interview questions did not ask directly if interviewees thought "God is watching me", there were no responses from Catholics indicating that God (or Jesus) was judging them based on whether or not they were helping others (in response to questions about why they give, why they volunteer, whether individuals have a responsibility to help others). One had God's love no matter what, even if one was not being generous.

Some Catholic interviewees hinted at a sense of obligation to the priest or nun: when they were asked if they'd be willing to take on a task, they acquiesced—often they didn't tell me why, save for noting that the priest or nun asked them. That was sufficient reason, as if to say, "how could I refuse"? A few spoke of an obligation to the Catholic community, the local parish in particular. For example a parishioner from Istanbul (# 3) said "when Fr. Giorgis asks our group to do something, we do our best to please him." Another parishioner, who is an immigrant from Thailand, in the same church (# 7) concurs: "we are a small community and the priests here cannot reach everything in the church. We should make things easier for them."

[18] She continued, saying "Something just in me says you must pay back, you must give something back to society; God obviously is working in me, my faith is there, otherwise I wouldn't do it….If you're asked to do something or somebody suggests something, or you have a thought, you have a responsibility. I don't know whether you call it faith or spirituality or responsibility." (#79)

Islam:
Duty to God: Islam emphasizes obedience to God's will. If God's will is that the individual be generous, then religiosity affects generosity by raising Muslims' sense of an obligation to God. […] It is "for the love of Allah" that one gives to others (Quran 2:177).

This belief is a significant factor for Muslims' generosity. Though not enforced by humans, it acts as a strong incentive and sanctioning mechanism**.** More than 85 percent of Muslim respondents indicated that they gave for the sake of God. Almost all the Gulen association interviewees understood their giving as due to their religious conviction that giving is a duty to God. Most respondents had the belief that what they own on the world are temporary; they are given to them by God to test the believers. To them, how they use these temporary resources here will have a big impact on their situation in the afterlife. They think that when they give, they give from God's property. (e.g. Istanbul 2, Istanbul 20, Paris 7). A quotation from an interviewee from Istanbul (#7) illustrates this point: "We do not see money and our belongings as our real property. We see them as God's deposit on us. We can fulfill our responsibility to that deposit if we use it properly. Giving for the sake of God is one way of fulfilling that responsibility." Some respondents quoted the following verse: "Behold, God has bought of the believers their lives and their possessions, promising them paradise in return" (Quran 9/111) (e.g. Paris 25). A businessman concurs this point with the following words: "When we give to others, we actually invest in ourselves. At first sight, it looks like we did something for someone else. But in reality, we discharge from a big responsibility to transferring God's property to those in need" (Istanbul 18).

The Muslim respondents conceptualize their giving to their associations in religious terms. In other words, they see their contributions to associations as their duty to God; because they see their associations' activities as a fulfillment of religious responsibilities. In the words of a respondent in Paris, "As a Muslim individual, God assigned me a responsibility for others. ; When I help our association reaching out who are in material and spiritual need, I also fulfill my own responsibility to God" (Paris 5). . In most cases, when Muslims support community associations, actually they think they fulfill their individual religious duties. The female respondents frequently brought up the role of associations for the kids' education and how it was a relief for them in fulfilling their own religious responsibilities toward the kids (Milan 3, Milan 11, Paris 11, Dublin 12, Istanbul 5). In contrast to the Catholic Church, the associations are not as regarded divine (there is no equivalent idea of a community of faithful as the *body* of a holy figure), but members want to maintain and strengthen them just because the associations help them fulfilling their own duties. The implication is: if the members feel associations are not fulfilling this task, they can easily withdraw their support. That associations are not considered divine makes them more accountable. Their legitimacy depends on their performance in fulfilling religious services.

As part of their religious convictions, most interviewees think that what they give does not belong to them. To them, it belongs to God and what they give is actually from God's property. Giving, to them, increases their benefit from that property. A significant percentage of interviewees argued that if they do not give, they lose the money one way or another. For example, one of the interviewees said that whenever he refuses to help to his association, he is caught by a policeman in the traffic and has to pay that in a fine the money he otherwise should

have given his association (Paris 3). The same view was echoed by an Istanbul Gulen movement member (#13), "If you do not give to the places that you are required to give, that [amount] will be taken from you eventually. You will experience a trouble and lose it anyway. … The purpose of helping others is to gain the contentment and love of God."

Specifically, and as hypothesized, the sense of having a duty to God and that duty or obligation being the reason one must give is very strong among Muslims. As an Istanbul interviewee stated, (#14): "Thanks to God, we are Muslims. God gives the property of the poor to the rich. He tests both of them. The poor [person] is tested for his patience, and the rich [person] is tested for his generosity. Giving is a must to pass the test." Another respondent from Istanbul (#21) has a similar take: "Giving is necessary to gain the contentment of God. You need to watch for the poor and needy around you to gain the God's approval for the life you live."

The respondents often addressed how the stories about the giving of the companions of Prophet Mohammed influenced their own giving. Along these lines, a respondent noted: "Why did God give us our resources? It is for us to use those resources wisely and responsibly." […] "Abu Bakr (the closest friend of Prophet Mohammed) spent all of his property in the path of God and to help others. He is a good model in front of us." Another interviewee from Istanbul agrees: "There is a life experienced by the Prophet and his friends. They struggled with lots of difficulties to live and preach their faith and religion. This is the biggest source of our motivation" (Istanbul 21). The statements of the Muslim religious leaders support this point. When asked how they increase the amount of contributions, they noted that increasing the religiosity of their followers through religious knowledge was one of the key means.

Community:

Catholicism operates less obviously with inter-group sanctions than with inter-group incentives: individuals who volunteered often voiced that they liked to be with people, to be focused on something, to be collaborating. No one said that being in a Catholic volunteer group was important in its own right. They were drawn because they are Catholic and the church/parish or other Catholic organizations were obvious and convenient/familiar to them. Those who volunteered in activities that sustained the religious life of the church, such as the children's ministry, reading the liturgy, being on the baptism or funeral team, often noted that doing so enabled them to attain a greater understanding of their faith, and noted that was important and rewarding to them (e.g. # 28, 50s Irish woman). Some also felt they had a responsibility toward the community: it needed the aid of each to run (# 30, 30s male): "everyone should play a part, not just one guy doing five jobs". Similar responses were taken from the Catholic minority in Istanbul. The participants of a volunteer group (the Legion of Mary) within the church indicated how they deepen their friendship within the group and convert it into good things (Istanbul Catholic 3, 10, 25). The women in this group (there was only one man member in the group) were mostly immigrants and they were both contributing to the activities organized by the church and their newcomer immigrant friends. Yet if everyone doesn't contribute, there are no mechanisms to sanction (or identify) the free-riders.

Community matters to Catholics. It is an important means of fostering their provision of public goods. Yet the means depend on attitudes towards the (religious) group, not sanctions or incentives (cf Tyler 2011, 32-33). People are attached to the parishes they were interviewed at,

they feel loyal to them, and they like working in the groups they are in or have volunteered with before.[19] This attitude of attachment ("affect") may have influenced their willingness to be involved and contribute, without them being aware of it. Indeed, the head of the St. Pierre de Montrouge parish Economic Council, in explaining that the diocese of Paris imposes a tax of about 16% on the parish in order to redistribute its wealth, and to use its wealth for some of the diocese's operating expenses, a number of parishioners have come up to him and said "I hope that what I give doesn't go to the diocese" (# 55). Some Irish parishioners expressed concern over the clustering of parishes (as did the priest at Ballygall), thinking the community spirit of the parish would be diminished, and that people might not be as willing to volunteer or give if their efforts went to a bigger entity less known to them. One parishioner there noted that "the first collection [at mass] is for the priests (and even some of that goes into the archbishop's house which people don't know and I think they should). I have a little bit of difficulty with the two baskets, especially the second one, which is for share. It's for building churches in Dublin. There's no churches that have been built. So I don't know where the money goes. I really don't know where the money goes. It goes into the Archbishop's House but I don't know what they do with it" (# 79). Many parishioners (CITES) expressed satisfaction with their experiences of working with other parishioners in the various organizations they volunteered in, and positive affect towards the priest, sister (nun) or friend who invited them to get involved. Some saw volunteering within the parish or with a Catholic charity as furthering the work of Jesus or of the Church in the world (CITES). This was also very evident among the congregants of the St. Esprit church in Istanbul. While the older and Levantine volunteers mostly referred their loyalty to the church (Istanbul Catholic 5, 6, 20), the younger and immigrant members mostly addressed the friendship within the church (Istanbul Catholic 10, 23, 24). In the words of a Pilipino lady who migrated to Turkey in 1990s, "when I first came to Turkey, a friend brought me to this church. I felt myself at home and since then I contribute either financially or volunteering in the church" (Istanbul 3). For most of the immigrants church is seen as a place where their problems are addressed within small friendship groups. But not contributing or volunteering had no negative community-level consequences.

While the religious community might facilitate Catholics being able to volunteer and give in certain ways, it would be a stretch to say it directly creates, as an incentive, one of the key factors interviewees mentioned when asked why they give or volunteer. Most said they got back more than they gave, that they thought it was more rewarding for them than for the people they helped, that they learned from those they helped. "I get repaid abundantly" (Italian woman in late 50s, # 11). A number of interviewees, especially the Irish, emphasized they "feel fortunate", and by helping are "giving thanks for what you got" and that because of this they want to "help the people who aren't" healthy or otherwise "ok" (# 30). A retired Frenchwoman said she feels she's been "spoiled by life" and got involved because she wanted to "give back" some of what she had received (# 42/43). An Irish woman who for a long time had the sense she's been blessed, and was fortunate, stated that there are people "for whom life is a lot harder and if I could help people, I'd like to" (#28). A retired woman in Istanbul also her happiness when she saw "the needs of the poor immigrants are met" within their volunteer group (Istanbul Catholic 16). In

[19] This is not exclusive to Catholicism or religious groups. There are a number of findings converging in the social sciences on the positive role attitudes towards the group, towards the task and affect/emotion towards the group play in motivating pro-social, cooperative behavior (Tyler 2011).

addition, many Italian and French interviewees mentioned that the interaction between "giver" and "recipient" itself was critical, for them it was a fundamental point of generosity—not just to give but to interact with the recipient. A number of interviewees strove to alter the term "recipient" so that it would not have the connotation of an impersonal exchange or unidirectional act (# 11 CITES). Notably, many of the Catholic charitable organizations are also trying to refashion notions of charity and "recipient" (#s 10, 41, 54, 67).[20]

Catholics sometimes cited giving to charities that tried to help the Catholic or at least Christian community overseas, such as in the Middle East (# 42/3). While indicative of a sense of community (or concern for the in-group), it is a weak incentive at best , and not at all a sanction, for the Catholic Church in eliciting pro-social or public goods provision by Catholics.[21]

Islam

Community ties are very important for the Gulen followers in general as they also feel part of global initiatives of the movement. For example, even though the Istanbul community was more open to outside charities, (1) they usually do this through the movement's own charitable agency (Kimse Yok Mu Solidarity and Aid Association), and (2) they have a feeling of ownership to many institutions that the movement opened globally. Gulen-affiliated Muslims seemed to be proud of being part of the larger Gulen community. This was evident in their appreciation of what the Gulen movement is doing globally. The mostly cited global endeavors of the movement were schools established in poorer regions of the world (especially Africa), the intercultural activities of the organization, and the sacrifices of the younger recruits of the movement (especially graduates of prestigious universities in Turkey who goes to very poor countries of the world as teachers). I got the feeling that most of my interviewees felt their relationship with the movement special, and their membership to the movement emotionally influenced them. The contributions they make feel them the builders of many global institutions of the movement. When we talked about charity, the movement-led educational institutions were the first things that came to my interviewees' minds. Even when they remember poverty, etc…, they refer to the movement's charitable organization for this kind of activities (Kimse Yok Mu?). This was especially evident in Istanbul and Paris, probably because the contributions in these cities are used to support global projects of the movement. The contributions in Italy and Ireland

---

[20] In most cases, at the time of our study, the structures necessary for public goods provision were already in place in the parishes and dioceses. We are not able to address, in this study, the conditions under which Catholicism, as an organized religion, provides the basic structures. Clearly, the cost of being a volunteer is lower if the structures are already in place. Yet we do have a few instances, and these cohere with the general tenor of our findings: either a priest decides to launch a program, and asks for volunteers, or one or more parishioners suggest a project to the priest, and he agrees, gives them some resources from general parish funds, and then they work on developing it, and asking for more volunteers. Paris: SVdP, Secours Catholique, Vicariat de la solidarité ; Dublin: SVdP, Crosscare; Milan: SVdP, Caritas Ambrosiana. SVdP operates partly out of parishes as the base, as does Caritas Ambrosiana, Crosscare is thematic and has projects in various areas, but does not try to have a group in every parish. Secours Catholique is organized nationally across the 95 continental dioceses as well as in the overseas territories; in Paris, it does not have identical groups in parishes but instead has projects in various areas.

[21] Our experiment data may be able to say more about this once the data are coded and analyzed.

hardly support within-country costs of the movement due to the small number of supporters living in these countries.

Two things strengthen group identity or sense of community of the people. First, the movement always informs its followers about their activities. Most of my subjects (almost 80 %) stated that to see the movement's local and global activities motivated them the most. Again most of my subjects in Istanbul and Paris (where the movement is large and have relatively richer followers) stated that they had foreign trips to see the activities of the movement abroad. Being informed increases the bonds of the followers to the movement. (e.g. Istanbul 21, 29; Paris 1, 5, 7). Being informed about the movement's activities increases the bonds of the followers to the movement. A middle age respondent who talks about his foreign trips with the association illustrates this point: "It is important that the voice of Turks and Muslims be heard in the world. […] What motivates me is to see what is being done. That opens my eyes. That gives me have new ideals and dreams. When you are in the movement and see what is being done, you understand the need and your worldview is shaped accordingly." Similarly, a respondent from Paris (# 7) mentioned how his trip to Pakistan organized by the association to help the victims of Pakistani flood deepened his relationship with the movement. Second, the lack of strong hierarchical structures increases group identity and awareness. Since each local setting has its own autonomy, the continuation of the activities requires local support. This creates a certain organizational pattern in which people involve in the activities more. The people make the investment decisions in their own local setting and they try to finance it with the local sources. The hierarchy works in encouraging people but the final decisions are taken locally. This makes the people have a feeling of ownership on what is being done in a certain place. This, in the end, strengthens their group identity to the movement.

In addition to this, these factors, members also have close relationships among one another and that friendship might also have a role in their sense of community and giving. Most of the interviewees indicated how their involvement in the associations also created a new social environment. That most of the interviewees see other members of the association at least once weekly and they work on different projects together make them develop social bonds among themselves. It is safe to say that almost 90 percent of the respondents attend at least one association-related event, weekly meeting being the most important one. A furniture storeowner from Istanbul (# 17) mentions friendship and giving equally: "Being involved in this movement made giving part of our personality. It is because you become part of a new social environment. Here, we compete for good things […] The place that I like the most is my village. I love to live there. Sometimes, I think to go back to my village and live there happily. I have money and do not need to work more to earn my life. However, when I go to my village just for visit, I miss my friends in two weeks. Also, I keep working here to give more. I cannot stop working in the existence of so many needs of the people."

In contrast to the Catholic parishes, most of the giving in the Muslim associations is public. As described above, the annual pledges, which constitute the major source of income for the associations, is public. While contributions are entirely voluntary, the pledges of the contributors are publicly announced in the room, in which the fundraising event is organized.

Although this is not announced at the association for the public, all the attendees in the room know how much others contribute. This gives Islam (or at least the Gulen movement)[22] a relatively powerful peer pressure sanctioning (and incentivizing) mechanism-one has an incentive to gain community approval by giving, and one is concerned about the sanction of community disapproval if one doesn't give. Statements from two interviewees in Istanbul (# 14 and 17) illustrate the point. One, a middle-aged man (# 14), when explaining his giving during the pledges explained that he compares his giving with others: "I see other people who have similar conditions with me giving more than I do. This encourages me to give more." Istanbul 17, who stated, "We compete for good things," also emphasized the social dimension of giving. He used a Turkish proverb when explaining the impact of peers on giving: "*Üzüm üzüme baka baka kararır*." The literal translation of this proverb is: "Grapes will darken by looking at each other." It means people mature (or develop habits) by learning from their peers. Also there is an hadith (the sayings of Prophet Mohammad) which was mentioned at times during the interviews with Muslims: "Compete for the good." Yet it was not evident that individuals who did not give much or at all were given the a cold shoulder at community functions or otherwise looked down upon. When talking about the pledges, the respondents did referred them as "incentives," rather than "sanctions," (Istanbul 18) and referred its origins in Islamic history origins (Paris 7). In the words of a respondent from Istanbul, (# 18) "Organized programs by the movement of course influence our giving. If we were alone, we would not give this much. We should remind the religious duties to each of us. This is what the movement does in a systematic way." The collection of the pledges is monitored through weekly meetings throughout the year. When followers pledge "they also mention how the payments will be. It may be an advance full payment or paid monthly or paid in the form of a few installments throughout the year. […] We kindly remind the contributors if it is not paid on the promised time. If they are not able to pay, of course, there is nothing to do" (Paris 24). The statements of a respondent from Istanbul (# 22) shows that "duty to God" comes into play in fulfilling the pledges as well: "When we pledge an amount, we feel that we promise God to give that amount. When we make the payment, we feel we are fulfilling our promise to God."

As with Catholicism, tangible benefits provided by the Islamic association are not exclusionary. They are basically public goods.[23] The goods are not "club" goods. In Istanbul and Paris, the association has private schools. These are tuition-based schools. Whoever wants to send their kids to these schools also pays the tuition (whether contributing to the movement or

[22] Kilinc observed that other Islamic associations/mosque also have a similar practice. He observed that the mosques in Tempe, AZ, East Lansing, MI and Omaha, NE pursue a similar strategy in the month of Ramadan. When asked about the origins of these pledges, we were told that this practice is originated from the time of Prophet Mohammad. When there was a need at the time, the public fundraising was organized and the companions of Mohammad competed one another for the good (Istanbul 24, Paris 30).

[23] For the schools in Paris and Istanbul (there was no school in Milan and Dublin), one does not have to be Muslim to attend to the school. The school in Paris had non-Muslim students as well. I was told that they work to sign a contract with the French state to get support from the state. However for the weekend school of the associations, this is practically not the case. In the weekend schools in all four cities, religious knowledge was taught to the kids. However, there was not a set rule that only Muslims could attend. But practically, no Christian would send their kids when Islam is taught. However, I was told in Milan that kids sometimes bring their Italian friends to the cultural center (Milan 21).

not). The school in Paris was new. They were looking for students to keep the school financially strong. So, there was no need to exclude some. However, it may be difficult for some to enroll their kids in the schools in Istanbul based on the size of the schools. In this situation, those who are in the front rows in contributing to the association may have a priority. (even though this was not confirmed during the fieldwork). But this sort of weak sanction was not seen in our research, and in itself does not appear to be a motivation for giving. Interviewees sometimes voiced a concern that if they did not donate funds, their children would, in the words of one, "our kids will not have proper facilities and will be in danger of losing their identity" (Interviewee # Paris 28). But it was the danger of not having enough resources to establish and maintain the institutions, not a fear of being excluded if one did not contribute. The Gulen movements not only allow others to attend the activities of the association (and send their kids to the school), they also expend considerable effort to have as many attending people (and kids at weekend school) as possible. Even when they ask financial support from the committed members, reaching out to others (including the less committed ones) is a reason in itself. As with the Catholic parishes (including on religious education where not provided by the public schools), there is no difference between contributors and non-contributors in benefiting from the activities of the associations.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION:

Religious discourse, with its emphasis on duty to God, is the most significant factor in Muslim groups' giving. However, the community norms are important for Gulen members as these norms help them re-invent their religious repertoire about giving. What Gulen associations do is remind people about religious values of giving. The associations perform religious services, build educational institutions around the world, and organize activities to inform people about Islam. Followers of the Gulen community support these activities because they see their realization as part of their religious duty. This makes them feel special about their membership in Gulen associations, making social identity theory a relevant perspective. All in all, there is an interaction effect between community expectations and duty to God.

For Catholics, the religion relies heavily on pro-social dispositions even as it has in its doctrines suggestions to be kind towards others. Even its spiritual sanctions are weak—Catholics were adamant that there is no duty to God to be generous, to help others, to be charitable. Rather, when they articulated the religious origins of their charitable or helping behaviors, it was framed as due to a love of God and a love of ones neighbor. Many were inspired by a sense of wanting to "give back". The religious rites and rituals do not exclude on the basis of whether or not one has contributed.

The institutional structures that were found to contribute to the provision of public goods for both Catholics and Muslims were generally decentralized, where laity were asked and encouraged to take on leadership roles within their particular religious community. Accordingly, institutional exhortations to encourage giving were generally downplayed, and instead encouragement to produce public goods by more informal channels, such as word of mouth, a church official making a request directly of a particular individual, and associational activity.

Formal institutional sanctions and incentives were not driving factors. Indeed, the informal ties within the community tended to provide both the sanctioning and incentive mechanisms driving behavior – and that tangible benefits don't seem to be exclusionary.

The analyses above have shown that both religions have institutional structures and belief systems that facilitate generosity, the providing of public goods at a cost in time and expense and effort to oneself. For these two mainstream religions, neither one has strong sanctioning or monitoring systems; Islam perhaps has a stronger one than Catholicism, but neither religion could be characterized as being a strict sect. Indeed, the main sanction for Muslims was an internalized belief that one has a duty to God that if not fulfilled will result in real losses on earth, as well as real disfavor from God. The main monitoring mechanism was also an internalized belief that God is watching ones' behavior. A secondary mechanism was in the form of the public declaration of giving, with a relatively weak follow-up mechanism (no public chastisement if one did not follow through, for instance). Catholicism lacks both those sanctioning and monitoring mechanisms (internalized and the weak external of Islam). It relies, as has been stated, on filling Catholics with a sense of God's love, of a relationship with Jesus, and, also quite evident, on a general culture of "it's good to help" and "I feel blessed so I give back." What becomes apparent in the data was the extent to which the religions activate and channel pro-social tendencies in individuals. In line with some recent research in behavioral economics and psychology, this raises the question whether it is appropriate to assume strict individual self-interest when contemplating humans in a social setting.

REFERENCES

Abdoun, Karim, Mathilde Chevre, Asthma Al Atayoui, and Abdel Aziz Faïk, eds. 2004. *Histoires de mosquées. Recueil de témoinages*. Schiltigheim: Editions Kalima.

Ahn, T.K., Justin Esarey, and John T. Scholz. 2009. "Reputation and Cooperation in Voluntary Exchanges: Comparing Local and Central Institutions." *Journal of Politics* 71/2 (April): 398-413.

Al-Ghazzali, Mohammad. 1966. *The Mysteries of Almsgiving: Ihya-i Ulum al-Din Book 5*. Beirut: American University of Beirut. Trans. Nabih Amin Faris.

Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999. "Public Goods And Ethnic Divisions." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(4) (November): 1243-1284.

Allievi, Stefano. 2003. *Islam Italiano. Viaggio nella seconda religione del paese*. Torino: Einaudi.

Andreoni, James and Justin Rao. 2011. "The Power of Asking: How communication Affects Selfishness, Empathy, and Altruism." *Journal of Public Economics* 95: 513-520.

Bailey, Betty Jane and J. Martin Bailey. 2003. *Who Are the Christians in the Middle East?* Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.

Bargh, J. A., and T.L. Chartrand. 2000. "The mind in the middle a practical guide to priming and automaticity research." In, *Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology*, eds. H. T. Reis and C. M. Judd. New York: Cambridge University Press, 253-284.

Basedevant-Gaudemet, Brigitte. 2000. "The Legal Status of Islam in France" In Silvio Ferrari and Anthony Bradney, eds. *Islam and European Legal Systems* Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 97-124.

Pope Benedict XVI. 2009. *Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate of the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XVI.* Vatican City.

Bennett, Andrew and Colin Elman. 2006. "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence." *Political Analysis*. 14: 250-267.

Benthall, Jonathan and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan. 2003. *The Charitable Crescent. Politics of Aid in the Muslim World*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Berman, Eli and David D. Laitin. 2008. "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model" *Journal of Public Economics*, 92/10-11 (Oct.): 1942-1967.

Borgonovi, Francesca. 2008. "Divided We Stand, United We Fall: Religious Pluralism, Giving, and Volunteering." *American Sociological Review* 73 (Feb.): 105-128.

Brady, Henry E. 2008. “Causation and Explanation in Social Science.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, eds. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 217-270.

Brady, Henry E. and David. Collier, eds. 2004. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards.* Lantham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.

Brady, Henry E., David Collier and Jason Seawright. 2006. “Toward a Pluralistic Vision of Methodology.” *Political Analysis*. 14: 353-368.

Buchanan, James. 1965. “An Economic Theory of Clubs.” *Economica* 32/125: 1-14.

Bugra, Ayse and Caglar Keyder. 2006. “The Turkish welfare regime in transformation.” *Journal of European Social Policy*. 16/3: 211-228.

CAF. Charities Aid Foundation. 2006. *International comparisons of charitable giving*. CAF briefing paper. November. www.cafonline.org.

Calhoun-Brown, Allison. 2000. “Upon This Rock: The Black Church, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement.” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 33, No. 2. (Jun.): 168-174.

Caputo, Richard K. 2009. "Religious Capital and Intergenerational Transmission of Volunteering as Correlates of Civic Engagement." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 38 (October).

Catechism of the Catholic Church. 1999. London: Geoffrey Chapman.

Ceccarini, Luigi. 2005. “Fedeli, secolarizzati, irregolari: i cattolici italiani.” *Il Mulino* 5 (Sept.-Oct.): 852-862

Cesari, Jocelyne. 1994. *Être Musulman en France*. Paris: Karthala

Chamlee-Wright and Virgil Henry Storr. 2009. “Club Goods and Post-Disaster Community Return.” *Rationality and Society* 21/4.

Chen, Daniel L. 2010. “Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from Islamic Resurgence during the Indonesian Financial Crisis.” *Journal of Political Economy* 118/2: 300 – 354.

Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2001. *Rational Ritual. Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Çizakça. Murat. 2001 *A History of Philanthropic Foundations: The Islamic World From the Seventh Century to the Present.* Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.

Clark, Janine A. 2004. *Islam, Charity, and Activism. Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Cohen, Adam B. 2009. “Many forms of culture.” *American Psychologist*, 64: 194-204

Cohen, Adam B., and P. C. Hill. 2007. “Religion as culture: Religious individualism and collectivism among American Catholics, Jews, and Protestants.” *Journal of Personality* 75: 709-742.

Cohen, Adam B., and P. Rozin. 2001. “Religion and the morality of mentality.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81: 697-710.

Cohen, Adam B., D.E. Hall, H.G. Koenig and K. Meador. 2005. “Social versus individual motivation: Implications for normative definitions of religious orientation.” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 9: 48-61.

Cohen, Adam B., J. I. Siegel and P. Rozin. 2003. “Faith versus practice: Different bases for religiosity judgments by Jews and Protestants.” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 33: 287-295.

Cohen, Adam B., Malka, A., Rozin, P., and Cherfas, L. 2006. “Religion and unforgivable offenses.” *Journal of Personality* 74: 85-118

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46/1: 13-28.

Conway, Daniel. 1995. “Faith versus money: Conflicting views of stewardship and fundraising in the church.” In *Cultures of Giving: How Region and Religion Influence Philanthropy*, eds. Charles H. Hamilton and Warren F. Ilchman. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 71-78.

Cornes, Richard and Todd Sandler. 1996. *The Theory of Externalities, Pubic Goods and Club Goods, 2nd Edition.* Cambridge University Press.

Dahlberg, Lena. 2005. “Interaction between Voluntary and Statutory Social Service Provision in Sweden: A Matter of Welfare Pluralism, Substitution or Complementarity?” *Social Policy and Administration* 39/7 (Dec. 2005): 740-763.

Dhingra, Pawan H., and Penny Edgell Becker. 2001. "Religious Involvement and Volunteering: Implications for Civil Society." *Sociology of Religion* 62/3: 315-335.

Eastis, Carla M. 1998. “Organizational Diversity and the Production of Social Capital. One of these groups is not like the other.” *American Behavioral Scientist*. 42/1 (Sept.): 66-77.

Eckstein, Susan. 2001. “Community as Gift-Giving: Collectivistic Roots of Volunteerism.” *American Sociological Review* 66 (Dec.): 829-851.

Enders, Craig K. 2001. “A primer on maximum likelihood algorithms for use with missing data.” *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal.* 8: 128-141.

Enders, Craig K. 2008. “A note on the use of missing auxiliary variables in FIML-based structural equation models.” *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal.* 15: 434-448.

FASLID. 2006. *L’exercice du culte musulman en France. Lieux de prière et d’inhumation*. Paris: La Documentation Française.

Fearon, James and David D. Laitin. 1996. “Explaining Inter-Ethnic Cooperation” *American Political Science Review* 90/4 (Dec 1996): 715-735.

Ferguson, Kristin M., Qiaobing Wu, Donna Spruijt-Metz and Grace Dyrness. 2007. “Outcomes Evaluation in Faith-Based Social Services: Are We Evaluating Faith Accurately?” *Research on Social Work Practice*. 17: 264-276.

Ferrari, Silvio. 1999. “State and Religion: the Italian System.” mss. http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/56/documents/Ferrari_Istanbul1999.pdf

Fetzer, Joel. S. and J. Christopher Soper. 2005. *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Finke, Roger and Rodney Stark. 1988. “Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious mobilization in American Cities, 1906." *American Sociological Review* 53:41-49.

Fischer, Robert L. 2008. “In God We Trust – All Others Bring Data: Assessing the State of Research on Faith-Based and Community Programming.” Paper presented at the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action annual conference, Philadelphia, PA, November 20-22, 2008

Flynn, Kieran. 2006. “Understanding Islam in Ireland.” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 17/2 (April): 223-238.

Frazee, Charles A. 1983. *Catholics and Sultans. The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453-1923.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fritz, M.S., and MacKinnon, D.P. 2007. “Requirement sample size to detect the mediated effect.” *Psychological Science* 18: 233-239.

Gerring 2005. “Causation. A Unified Framework for the Social Sciences.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 17/2: 163-198.

Gerring, John. 2004. “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” *American Political Science Review* 98/2 (May): 341-354.

Gerring, John. 2007. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gill, Anthony and Erik Lundsgaarde. 2004. "State Welfare Spending and Religiosity: A Cross-National Analysis," *Rationality and Society* 16/4: 399-436

Gill, Anthony J. 1998. *Rendering Unto Caesar. the Catholic Church and the State in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Goertz, Gary. 2006. *Social Science Concepts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gorsuch, R. L., and McPherson, S. E. 1989. Intrinsic/extrinsic measurement: I/E-revisited and single-item scales. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 28: 348-354.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101/4 (Nov.): 709-726.

Harris, Fredrick C. 1999. *Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hassan, Riaz. 2002. *Faithlines: Muslim conceptions of Islam and society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Healy, Kieran. 2000. "Embedded Altruism: Blood Collection Regimes and the European Union's Donor Population." *American Journal of Sociology*. 105/6 (May): 1633-57.

Healy, Kieran. 2006. *Last Best Gifts. Altruism and the Market for Human Blood and Organs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Himes, Kenneth R. 2006. "Vatican II and Contemporary Politics." In *The Catholic Church and the Nation-State. Comparative Perspectives*. Eds. Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, and Clyde Wilcox, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 15-32.

Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith. 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games." *American Economic Review* 86(3): 653-60..

Hungerman, Daniel M. 2005. "Are church and state substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 welfare reform." *Journal of Public Economics* 89: 2245-2267.

Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes and Other Collectives." *Journal of Political Economy* 100: 271-291.

Iannacone, Laurence R. and Eli Berman. 2006. "Religious Extremism: the good, the bad, and the deadly." *Public Choice* 128/1-2: 109-129.

Iversen, Torben. 2005. *Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ji, C. and Y. Ibrahim. 2007. "Islamic doctrinal orthodoxy and religious orientations: Scales development and validation." *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 17: 189-208.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. and Matthew Adam Kocher. 2007. "How 'Free' Is Free Riding In Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem." *World Politics* 59 (January): 177–216

Kaul, Inge, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern. 1999. "Introduction." *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century.* New York: The United Nations Development Programme.

Keister, Lisa A. 2003. "Religion and Wealth: The Role of Religious Affiliation and Participation in Early Adult Asset Accumulation" *Social Forces* 82: 173-205.

Keister, Lisa A. 2007. "Upward Wealth Mobility: Exploring the Roman Catholic Advantage." *Social Forces* 85: 1195-1226.

Keister, Lisa A. 2008. "Conservative Protestants and Wealth: How Religion Perpetuates Asset Poverty." *American Journal of Sociology* 113/5 (March): 1237-1271.

Kilinc, Ramazan. 2007. "Patterns of Interaction between Islam and Liberalism: The Case of the Gulen Movement." In *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement*, ed. İhsan Yılmaz, London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 118-139.

Kissane, Bill. 2003. "The Illusion of State Neutrality in a Secularising Ireland." *West European Politics* 26/1 (Jan.): 73-94.

Klaussen, Jytte. 2005. *The Islamic Challenge. Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kniss, Fred and Paul D. Numrich. 2007. *Sacred Assemblies and Civic Engagement. How Religion Matters for America's Newest Immigrants*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Kozlowski, Gregory C. 1998. "Religious Authority, Reform, and Philanthropy in the Contemporary Muslim World." In *Philanthropy in the World's Traditions*, eds. Warren F. Ilchman, Stanley N. Katz and Edward L. Queen II. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 279-308.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2003. "Fetullah Gülen's Search for a Middle Way Between Modernity and Muslim Tradition." In Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, eds. *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 115-130.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2005. "Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases." *Political Science Quarterly*, 120/ 2 (Summer): 253-274.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2009. , *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: United States, France and Turkey.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lacey, Jonathan. 2009. "The Gülen Movement in Ireland: Civil Society Engagements of a Turkish Religio-cultural Movement." *Turkish Studies* 10/2 (June): 295-315.

Landman, Nico and Wendy Wessels. 2005. "The Visibility of Mosques in Dutch Towns." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31/6 (Nov.): 1125-1140

Le Coz, Raymond. 1995. *L'Église d'Orient. Chrétiens d'Irak, d'Iran et de Turquie*. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf.

Leech, Beth L. 2002. "Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 354 (Dec.): 665-668.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1998. *The Rebel's Dilemma*. University of Michigan Press.

Loveland, Matthew T., David Sikkink, Daniel J. Myers, and Benjamin Radcliff. 2005. "Private Prayer and Civic Involvement." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 44/1: 1-14.

Makowsky, Michael D. 2011. "A Theory of Liberal Churches." *Mathematical Social Sciences* 61: 41–51

Makowsky,M.D. 2011. "Religion, Clubs, and Emergent Social Divides." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.012

Manço, Altay. 1997. "Des organizations sociopolitiques comme solidarité Islamique dans l'immigration Turque en Europe." *Les Annales de l'autre Islam*. 4: 97-133.

Maréchal, Brigitte. 2003. "Mosques, Organisations and Leadership." In *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe. Religion and Society*, eds. Brigitte Maréchal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jørgen Nielsen. Leiden: Brill, 79-150.

Mares, Isabela. 2003.*The Politics of Social Risk. Business and Welfare State Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mares, Isabela. 2006. *Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Unemployment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, D. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McBride, Michael. 2007. "Club Mormon: Free-Riders, Monitoring, and Exclusion in the LDS Church" *Rationality and Society* 19; 395.

McBrien, Richard P. 1980. *Catholicism*. Vol. II. Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press.

McChesney, Robert D. 1995. “Charity and Philanthropy in Islam: Institutionalizing the Call to Do Good.” Indiana University Center on Philanthropy Essays on Philanthropy No. 14.

McLoughlin, Séan.2005. “Mosques and the Public Space: Conflict and Cooperation in Bradford.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31/6 (Nov.): 1045-1066Miller dissertation

McVeigh, Rory and David Sikkink. 2001. “God, Politics, and Protest: Religious Beliefs and the Legitimation of Contentious Tactics.” *Social Forces* 79/4: 1425-58.

Miller, Sharon Louise. 1999. *The Symbolic Meaning of Religious Giving.* Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, Indiana.

Millsap, Roger E. 1997. “Invariance in measurement and prediction: Their relationship in the single-factor case.” *Psychological Methods* 2: 248-260.

Millsap, Roger E. 1998. “Group differences in regression intercepts: Implications for factorial invariance.” *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 33: 403-424.

Morris, Aldon. 1981. "Black Southern Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization." *American Sociological Review*. 46:744-67.

Negri, Augusto Tino and Silvia Scaranari Introvigne. 2005. *Musulmani in Piemonte: in Moschea, al Lavoro, nel Contesto Sociale*. Milano: Guerini e associati.

Nickerson, David W. 2005. “Scalable Protocols Offer Efficient Design for Field Experiments.” *Political Analysis* 13: 233-252.

Norenzayan, Ara and Azim F. Shariff. 2008. “The Origin and Evolution of Religious Prosociality.” *Science* 322 (Oct.): 58-62.

Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Orman, Wafa Hakim. 2011. “Survival of the Strictest? An Experimental Examination of Club Goods.” *Working Paper*, March 24, 2011.

Özgüç Orhan. 2008. “Islamic Himmah and Christian Charity: An Attempt at Interfaith Dialogue,” in *Islam in the Age of Global Challenges: Alternative Perspectives of the Gülen Movement* [Conference Proceedings]. Washington DC: Rumi Forum, 561-582.

Petersen, Roger D. 2001. *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pirotta, Laura. 2008. *Il Migrante Turco tra imprenditoria etnica e Organizzazioni Religioise: La Realtà della Città di Como.* Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi Milano.

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Putnam, Robert D. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30/2: 137-174.

Queen, Edward L., II. 1996. "The Religious Roots of Philanthropy in the West: Judaism, Christianity and Islam." Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy. Working Paper No. 96-4.

Qur'an, The. 2004. trans. M.A.S. Abdel Haleem. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rhodes, R.A.W., Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, eds. 2006. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rozin, P. (2003). Five potential principles for understanding cultural differences in relation to individual differences. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 37, 273-283.

Ruiter, Stijn and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 2006. "National Context, Religiosity, and Volunteering: Results from 53 Countries." *American Sociological Review* 71 (April): 191-210.

Sakaranaho, Tuula. 2006. *Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam. Cross-Reading Finland and Ireland*. Leiden: Brill.

Salihoglu, Serhat. 2002. "Welfare state policies in Turkey." *South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs*. 4: 21-26.

Samuelson, Paul. 1954. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 36: 387-89.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2006. "Ordinary Language Interviewing." In *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, eds. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 150-160..

Scheepers, Peer, and Manfred Te Grotenhuis. 2005. "Who Cares for the Poor? Micro and Macro Determinants for Alleviating Poverty in 15 European Countries." *European Sociological Review* 21/5 (Dec.): 453-465.

Scott, James C. 2009. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Shariff, Azim F. and Ara Norenzayan. 2007. “God is Watching You. Priming God concepts Increases Prosocial Behavior in an Anonymous Economic Game.” *Psychological Science* 18/9: 803-809.

Smith, Christian and Michael O. Emerson. 2008. *Passing the Plate. Why American Christians Don’t Give Away More Money*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Kevin B. 2006. “Representational Altruism: The Wary Cooperator as Authoritative Decision Maker.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50/4 (Oct.): 1013-1022.

Stark, Rodney and Laurence R. Iannaccone. 1994. “A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the “Secularization” of Europe” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 33/3 (Sept.): 230-252

Sweetser, Thomas P. “The money crunch: Why don’t Catholics give more?” *Chicago Studies* 30 (April): 99-111.

Tarrow, Sidney. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Revised and Updated Third Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 1998, 2011.

Tcholakian, Hovhannes J. 1998. *L’Eglise Armenienne Catholique en Turquie*. Istanbul: Ohan Matbaacilik.

Trejo, Guillermo. 2009. "Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico." *American Political Science Review* 103/3 (August): 323-342.

Tsai, Lily L. 2007. “Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China.” *American Political Science Review* 101/2 (May): 355-372.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Warneken, Felix, et. al. 2006. “Altruistic Helping in Human Infants and Young Chimpanzees.” *Science* 311: 1301-3

Warneken, Felix and Michael Tomasello. 2008. “Extrinsic rewards undermine altruistic tendencies in 20 month-olds.” *Developmental Psychology* 44/6: 1785-1788.

Warneken, Felix and Michael Tomasello. 2009. “The Roots of human altruism.” *British Journal of Psychology* 100: 455-471

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 1997. “Islamic Mobilization and Political Change: The Islamist Trend in Egypt’s Professional Associations.” *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Reports*. Edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Deleted: **Warneken, Felix and** Michael Tomasello. 2008. “Extrinsic rewards undermine altruistic tendencies in 20-month-olds.” *Developmental Psychology*, 44(6), 1785 - 1788.¶

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2004. “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory.” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach.” Edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz: Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Will, Jeffry A. and John K. Cochran. 1995. “God Helps Those Who Help Themselves?: The Effects of Religious Affiliation, Religiosity, and Deservedness on Generosity Toward the Poor.” *Sociology of Religion* 56/3: 327-338.

Wood EJ. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2003. *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zayas, Farishta G. de. 1960. *The Law and Philosophy of Zakat, the Islamic welfare system.* Damascus: A.Z. Abbasi.

THE PROFILE OF SOME OF THE INTERVIEWEES (additional to follow)

Basic Descriptive Numbers about some of the Interviewees

	Muslims in Istanbul	***Muslims in Paris***	***Muslims in Milan***	***Muslims in Dublin***	***Catholics in Istanbul***
Total Number	31	31	32	30	28
Female	12	10	8	6	9
Male	19	21	24	24	19
Age	18-24: 1 25-36: 20 37-55: 9 56-70: 1 71-: 0	18-24: 1 25-36: 15 37-55: 14 56-70: 1 71-: 0	18-24: 4 25-36: 18 37-55: 7 56-70: 0 71-: 0	18-24: 3 25-36: 18 37-55: 7 56-70: 0 71-: 0	18-24: 0 25-36: 9 37-55: 10 56-70: 8 71-: 1
Socio-economic Status	1: 0 2: 14 3: 10 4: 1 5: 2 No Ans: 4	1: 3 2: 10 3: 8 4: 5 5: 0 No Ans: 5	1: 0 2: 13 3: 8 4: 7 5: 0 No Ans: 4	1: 1 2: 6 3: 3 4: 9 5: 1 No Ans: 10	1: 0 2: 11 3: 10 4: 7 5: 0 No Ans: 0

Table: Church Administration Statistics

Diocese	Catholics	Total Population	Percent Catholic	Diocesan Priests	Religious Priests	Total Priests	Catholics Per Diocesan Priest	Catholics Per Priest	Permanent Deacons	Parishes
Archdiocese of Dublin	1,087,285	1,291,581	84.2%	499	844	1,343	2,178	809		200
Archdiocese of Milan	4,860,053	5,107,053	95.2%	2,216	913	3,129	2,193	1,553	67	1,108
Archdiocese of Paris	1,548,996	2,212,851	70.0%	566	730	1,296	2,736	1,195	94	116
Vicariate Apostolic of Istanbul	15,000			2	30	32	7,500	468		13

- Source: The Hierarchy of the Catholic Church (www.Catholic-Hierarchy.org) from the 2005 Annuario Pontificio
- All statistics for the year 2004.